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ABSTRACT
The public housing program was established by the
Housing Act of 1937 to provide decent, safe, and sanitary
homes for families of low income. The Act set few guidelines
for choosing which families of low income would live in a
small number of public housing units. The debate over
which of the poor should live in public housing has continued
since the beginning of the program.
The lack of substantive federal policy direction on
this question left the Local Housing Authorities which
operated the decentralized program to make difficult policy
decisions regarding racial discrimination, income deter-
mination, priority order, and basis for rejection.
In the past decade, however, the balance between the
federal government and -the Local Housing Authorities has
shifted. The legal, social, and economic environment in
which public housing had been operating has changed drastically.
The federal government has responded to those changes by
issuing more stringent requirements for tenant selection.
This thesis examines the gaps between federal
legislation, regulations passed by the federal agencies
which interpreted the legislation, and the implementation
of those rules by one Local Housing Authority in Cambridge,
Massachusetts. The thesis traces the evolution of national
policy regarding tenant selection and the written and
unwritten procedures of the Cambridge Housing Authority from
1950 until 1975. It explores the interface of the formal
and informal systems of tenant selection in Cambridge by
examining.the tenant populations at three federal public
housing developments.
Thesis Supervisor: Langley C. Keyes
Title: Professor of City and Regional Planning; Head of the
Department
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Lofty ideals get translated into policies and programs by
Senators and Congresspeople in Washington. The dynamics of the
legislative process often require that statutes be vague and
flexible. While ambiguities in legislation are often requisite to
insure passage of a piece of legislation, those same loosely
defined sections and missing pieces must be interpreted into
procedures which allow the program to function. Federal agencies
must clarify and interpret legislation in order for programs to
operate.
A gap exists between the legislation as passed by Congress
and the regulations which are issued by the federal agency that
administers the national program. The bureaucracy must study the
statutes and legislative history in order to interpret legislative
intent and create regulations which implement Congressional policy.
The bureaucracy must take the leap from policy to procedures in
order to standardize operations nationwide.
A second gap is apparent between the written directives from
Washington and the written official policy of the locality.
Because the federal agency has the power to monitor the local
agency and enforce compliance with regulations, this gap should
be small. However, if the federal agency does not effectively
monitor local practices, the gap between federal and local written
rules might be substantial.
1
2A third gap exists between the written policy of the locality
and the everyday practice of the local agency. It is in this
setting that the functioning staff member comes in direct contact
with the consumers of the program. It is at this phase of
implementation that issues of agency and personal values, stress,
and pressures from sources in the community influence the outcomes
of the program. It is at this phase that any ambiguities in the
law or regulations must become resolved. The resolution may be
piecemeal, or guided by factors other than logic, but most
questions must be answered in order to proceed with the program.
The process of implementation is not static. Presidential
administrations change, legislation gets amended, court decisions
interpret laws differently, federal rules and regulations are
modified, local agencies alter their focus, bureaucrats retire,
and consumers organize around their own demands. National and
local conditions vary; the nature of client populations shifts.
Yet as the federal government changes its official posture
by amending legislation, the gap between legislative intent and
local implementation often grows. Rules and regulations are often
long in the making. By the time the federal agency monitors the
local implementation of change in regulations, it is often years
after the national political process has advocated and enacted
such changes.
With each modification in the environment, the local
implementers can decide to change their practices correspondingly.
By the same token, they can default or choose to ignore some or
all of the often conflicting messages they receive. The magnitude
3of gaps between policy, procedure, and practice, therefore, varies
over time. Each locality may interpret the regulations differently
and choose to implement provisions in a different manner.
The United States Housing Act of 1937 and its amendments are
a clear-cut example of this paradigm of gaps, particularly with
respect to the issue of client identification. The legislation
does not define who should live in public housing. The number of
families who meet the established statutory requirements for
eligibility has been much larger than the number of housing units
available. Yet the federal government did not establish a
standardized way to distribute these units until the public housing
program had been in operation for thirty years.
Housing is not a commodity which can be divided into an equal
number of pieces to meet the needs of intended beneficiaries, as,
for example, Food Stamps, Social Security, or Aid to Families of
Dependent Children. Housing is both expensive and time-consuming
to produce. If the eligible population doubles, the government
cannot halve the amoung of existing housing to be distributed to
each recipient. No landlord can lease one-half of an apartment.
In addition, unlike cash payments or vouchers, housing units vary
greatly. Because Congress never appropriated enough housing units
to meet the needs of the client population, some allocative mechanism
had to be found to refine the definition of beneficiaries. In
general, the initiative on this matter was left to local authorities.
Other federal programs share this indivisible quality with
housing programs. The number of positions in day care centers,
job training programs, some health programs, and nursing homes
4are limited to a small percentage of the eligible population.
Class size and beds available are limited. Some people are chosen
above others to participate in the programs. Yet the public
housing program is a large income and goods transfer. It can
interfere with the private market in a much more substantial manner
than most other government programs. The distribution of benefits
has been more controversial than that of other programs.
Congress never made the difficult choices regarding allocation.
The law outlined income limits for eligible recipients. Financing
arrangements with Local Housing Agencies (LHA) required that
operating and maintenance costs be covered by rent payments.
Public housing was never intended for families with no income, for
they could pay no rent. The upper limits on income were set by
local rental market conditions and construction costs. But within
these confines, should public housing be a temporary arrangement
for the temporarily poor? Or should it house those families
unlikely to "outgrow" their poverty? Should it house ex-convicts?
Or mothers of illegitimate children? Only local residents?
Welfare recipients? Elderly people without families? Should it
encourage racial segregation or integration? Until recently,
these questions were not addressed either in legislation or by
federal agencies. Historically, LHAs have created their own
selection mechanisms and chosen which of the poor would live in a
finite amount of public housing. The lack of formal policy
directives and procedures has allowed the localities to develop
their own mechanisms with little national control.
5As a result of the lack of federal direction, LHAs across the
country made the initial choice to house "good" families. The
definition of "good" varied from place to place, but at the time
when the first public housing legislation was passed, many working,
intact, stable families were also poor and in great need of
standard housing. No dearth of "good" applicants existed. Because
few rules limited the freedom of local authorities to select
tenants, most LHAs chose .families with male, working heads, no
apparent social problems or criminal record, who were clean
housekeepers and would pay the rent. The determination of
eligibility was made through screening of applicants, home visits,
and record and reference checks. Applicants who were found to be
ineligible had no legal rights. Housing developments were generally
segregated, a policy which was implicitly endorsed by the Congress
and federal agencies.
Other factors came into play, however, for even the number of
"good" families generally exceeded the number of apartments
available when the program began. Politicians distributed patronage
in the form of public housing units; Board members repaid favors
by securing apartments for friends and relatives.
The extent to which "good" families were housed also varied
from city to city. After 1949, some large cities used public
housing as a supplement to the urban renewal program. Public
housing was the place where slum dwellers removed from urban
renewal sites were eventually rehoused. In some cities, there
was no choice for the LHA but to house all displacees.
6The 1950s saw the expansion of other housing programs,
notably low-interest federally-insured home mortgages. The
enlargement of housing opportunities in the suburbs changed the
market for public housing. Applicants increasingly became those
families who were trapped in central cities by the very nature
of their poverty. Yet in most cities Local Housing Authorities
tried to buy time by "creaming" the waiting list for good
applicants. The changing tenant populations and the sterile and
overpowering design of housing projects built during the 1950s
created hostility in many communities against the entire public
housing program. The changing image created a cycle of abandonment
by many "good" families which led to a dual system of "good"
projects and "bad" projects.
The 1960s wrenched the informal system of distributing
apartments. With the Civil Rights movement and the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, the practices of public housing authorities came
under attack. National pressures for equality led to the imposi-
tion of non-arbitrary procedures which tightened bureaucratic
control over tenant selection. The Courts imposed new rules.
Client groups organized and demanded their rights.
Litigation since the mid-sixties has been influential in
revising the concept of public housing from that of a charity and
a privilege which brought with it few rights, to that of a social
program that included rights of due process guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment. Previously, Local Housing Agencies had no
sense of being legal institutions. Discrimination against welfare
recipients, mothers of illegitimate children, and non-residents,
7practiced in LHAs across the country, were eliminated by federal
courts as criteria for tenant selection. In Holmes v. New York
City Housing Authority [398 F 2nd 262) the federal court ruled
that New York must have a set of "ascertainable standards" for
selecting tenants. Other cases (e.g., Davis v. Toledo Metropolitan
Authority [311 F Supp 795J, Thompson v. Housing Authority of Little
Rock (282 F Supp 575]) tightened procedural tenant selection
requirements for Local Housing Authorities. Following the courts'
intervention, the Department of Housing and Urban Development
issued rules which limited the discretion of the local authority.
Along with the increased legal influence, the nature of federal
intervention has greatly increased in the 1970s.
The establishment of more stringent controls over Local
Housing Authorities has been accompanied by the further decline in
the market for public housing among "good" families. As federal
and legal requirements for administration tightened, many local
authorities became unable to implement legally sound procedures
for rejecting or evicting tenants. The dual system intensified as
"bad" tenants were not rejected, but assigned to "bad" developments.
This paper is an examination of the gaps between federal
statutes passed in Washington and the projects themselves. It is
an analysis of the policy, procedures, and outcomes of a single
program in a single location. It is an historical study of the
legislation, federal rules and regulations, local written policy,
and actual implementation of the policy regarding tenant selection
for federally-aided low rent public housing in Cambridge,
Massachusetts.
8In order to further pursue the assertion of a dual system
the thesis will look at three housing projects in Cambridge.
Washington Elms, built in 1942, has the reputation of being one
of Cambridge's worst, marked by high turnover, rapid racial change,
and delapidated physical conditions. Putnam Gardens was built in
1954 and, despite its location in a deteriorated part of the city,
has remained a healthy, racially mixed development. Corcoran
Park, built in 1953, is Cambridge's most desirable development.
The populations of the three developments will be examined over
time to understand the relationship of the dual housing system
with the formal and informal tenant selection and assignment
process.
CHAPTER II
DIRECTION FROM WASHINGTON
The public housing program was established in 1937 with very
little federal definition of how it would operate at the local
level. The lack of federal directions left local housing agencies
to devise systems for choosing tenants to live in public housing
developments.
Throughout the history of public housing, the issues of race,
income, priority order (in what order should applicants be housed),
and basis for rejection (who should not be housed) have been
important considerations in the implementation of the public
housing program. Congress has often skirted the issues and in the
absence of statutory policy, the agencies which created, controlled,
and monitored public housing procedures have also had to create
general policy. The more ambiguous, contradictory, or absent
statutory policy has been, the more difficult it has been for
federal agencies to determine nationwide standards and procedures.
Federal agencies have in turn often neglected to set standards or
procedures, or to monitor the implementation of the procedures
which they did establish. With little federal guidance, or with
contradictory or frequently changing statements, as well as only
very slow federal recognition of the changing circumstances at the
local level, the localities were free to choose their own answers
to these four issues. This chapter will trace the historical
background of four major issues of tenant selection and the way
in which the federal government has addressed them in legislation
and regulations.
9
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THE ISSUES
Race
Patterns of racial segregation were patently obvious when
public housing was proposed. Indeed, poverty, housing, and race
were then, as now, inextricably intertwined issues. In practice,
public housing was built as "separate but equal." The 1954 U.S.
Supreme Court decision of Brown v. the Board of Education did not
precipitate any change of federal procedures regarding race-
determined occupancy. Housing projects were constructed for
"White," "Negro," or "Mixed" occupancy. Segregated occupancy was
overruled by a 1954 case in California rHousing Authority of the
City and County of San Francisco et. al. v. Banks et. al) and a
1957 case (Eleby v. City of Louisville Municipal Housing Authority],
but no changes in procedures ensued. Regulations regarding site
selection, per-unit cost, and priority order had implications for
the racial distribution of public housing tenants. Yet, because
of the implicit assumption that the developments were to be racially
segregated, the discrimination inherent in the construction or
tenant selection program was not attacked until the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.
Despite the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the
circulars promulgated by the Department of Housing and Urban
Development regarding implementation of the act, many important
questions regarding racial discrimination remain. Should public
housing, given the limited housing opportunitites for minority
families in the private market, be a program for housing only
ll
minority families? * Should public housing disrupt existing segre-
gated housing patterns? Is it essential for a housing authority
to maintain integrated developments, or should developments be
all of one ethnic group? Should a Local Housing Authority take
action to retain options for the city's white poor? Should public
housing in all-white or all-minority neighborhoods be integrated?
Is there a pace at which integration of a housing development
ought to take place in order to prevent whites from fleeing the
development or the neighborhood? Does a Local Housing Authority
have the responsibility to protect minority families moving into
all-white developments (or vice-versa) from racial harrassment?
Where should new public housing be built? Should applicants be
forced to accept a given development or give up the option of
living in public housing, or should free choice of location be
maximized, regardless of its implications for segregation?
Income
Although the original housing legislation based eligibility
for public housing developments on low income, this requirement
was defined only loosely. "Families of low income" were to be the
recipients of the program. These families were those who "are in
the lowest income group and who cannot afford to pay enough to
cause private enterprise in their locality or metropolitan area to
build an adequate supply of decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings
While the issue of segregation in public housing began as a black/
white problem, it has been expanded to encompass other racial and
ethnic groups, including Puerto Rican8, Chicanos, American Indians,
Orientals, etc. as "minority." The term "Minority" is meant to
include all of these groups.
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for their use."1 Regulations further refined this definition, but
many questions were left unanswered. For example, the applicability
of the income of a secondary wage earner or the family's assets
and savings accounts in determining income were left to the local
authority. Questions of how income should be measured have been
answered, but fundamental questions of the social mix of develop-
ments have been left unresolved. What kind of income mix is
desirable? If the public housing program is for only the very
poor, the housing developments will not be solvent; but if the
program houses the not-so-poor, where and how can the very poor
afford housing? Realtors, mortgage bankers, and homebuilders have
not wanted public housing to capture part of their own market.
Can the dual objectives of non-interference with their client
population and maintenance of financially sound housing developments
be achieved? Further, the source of the applicants' income was a
matter of policy which was not clearly stated until the program
had been in operation for twelve years. Does it make a difference
whether income is earned or from public assistance? Given that
many of the nation's poorest families are living on meager welfare
incomes, should public housing make a concerted effort to house
them? Conversely, should public housing be a reward for working
poor families, thereby leaving welfare families to pay a large
portion of their income for substandard housing? Should public
housing, in other words, distinguish between the "worthy" (working,
intact, stable and/or elderly families) and the "unworthy" (welfare,
broken families) poor? Should each development have a mix of
working and welfare families? Should income limits depend upon
- ---- ---
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family size? Should deductions from income be allowed in
determining eligibility, in order to compensate for extraordinary
expenses such as medical costs? Should income limits be set
nationally or should they be locally determined so as to encompass
regional differences?
Priority Order
If there were enough public housing units for everyone who
was eligible (however defined) to receive an apartment when s/he
needed it, the order of selection would not be important. However,
depending upon the turnover in developments, the difference
between being number 1 on a waiting list and number 10 may be years.
At various times, certain classes of families have been given
priority in an effort to reward or compensate them. Servicemen
and defense workers were housed first during World War II; veterans
were granted priority after the War; slum-clearance and redevelop-
ment displacees jumped ahead of others on the waiting list after
the Housing Act of 1949. If vacancies are few, granting priority
to one segment of the population may effectively eliminate the
chance of people in other segments of society to get apartments.
Should public housing be compensation for people who are
punished by the government in other ways? Should applicants who
live in the worst housing conditions be given preference for public
housing? Can blight-elimination, the rebuilding of slums, and
public housing be successfully coordinated? Should the selection
process be first-come, first-served or based upon an assessment
of need? Should some people be eligible for one housing development
and not another? Should applicants be able to choose the
14
development in which they would like to live or be forced to take
their chances in a lottery system? If selection order is based
upon need, how can that need be assessed?
Basis for Rejection
While public housing is for families of low income, it has
been clear from federal debate as well as local practice that it
has not been for all families of low income. Some people have
been barred from housing because of race, because no housing
developments existed in their neighborhood or city, or because
they have been on welfare. Legislation, inasmuch as it has only
vaguely defined the intended recipients, has not been explicit
about who should not be housed. The courts have clarified some
of the questions in recent years.
Is public housing the proper place for unmarried mothers and
children born out of wedlock? For criminals and ex-convicts? For
alcoholics and drug addicts? For poor housekeepers? Should public
housing be restricted to families or should poor individuals also
be housed? Should tenants be citizens of the United States?
Should they be local residents? What is the public responsibility
of public housing to provide homes for those who, because of their
social behavior, are unable to find other housing arrangements?
By the same token, what is the responsibility of the Local Housing
Authority to provide a secure and stable environment for tenants
to raise their families? Can the contradictory requirements of
housing society's outcasts and providing a stable living environment
be combined? Is there a proportional threshold beyond which the
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presence of "troubled" families can not be tolerated? If troubled
families are accepted as tenants, moreover, does the housing
authority owe them any special consideration or social services?
Housing officials have argued for viewpoints regarding tenant
selection over the years.2 The controversy continues today. The
four points are:
-- that the Local Housing Agency should accept every
applicant who meets the statutory eligibility
requirements;
-- that an applicant should be screened out of public
housing if s/he has a known criminal record, is a
drug addict, has a history of immorality, or an active
case of tuberculosis; but that welfare recipients,
as well as emotionally and socially maladjusted
families, be accepted as provided under the law;
-- that public housing is a business, and like other
businesses, should base its tenant selection practices
on the ability of a tenant to pay the rent;
-- that the spirit of the public housing acts has been
that housing projects should be nuclei for new communi-
ties and not institutions for problem families.
Therefore, only "normal" families should be allowed
to live in them.
The lack of a clear statement of policy, whether as a compromise
to interest groups or due to a general lack of consensus, is
indicative of the variety of purposes that public housing has
promoted. It has been used not only to provide homes for low-income
families, but has been a means for stimulating employment, for
clearing and/or improving the slums, for rewarding veterans, for
facilitating removal of poor residents from urban renewal areas,
to supplement the welfare system, and as housing of last resort.
The questions raised by the four issues of race, income,
priority order, and basis for rejection continued to be debated
among local housing officials and federal agencies. With few
16
exceptions, the federal government has either remained silent or
given mixed messages to local authorities on the answers to the
questions raised in this section. A historical discussion of the
legislation and the rules and regulations which addressed or
failed to address these key questions follows.
BACKGROUND: MULTIPLE GOALS, MULTIPLE CLIENTS
The failure of national leadership to provide answers to key
questions regarding the selection of tenants to live in public
housing can be attributed to the variety of purposes which public
housing was intended to serve and the compromises which have been
made to enable any federal intervention in housing development.
This section will trace the early history of the public housing
program.
The Federal Housing System
The Depression years saw stagnation in the housing business,
high unemployment, overcrowding of families and intensification of
slums. With the massive social programs of the New Deal, the
federal government, under the Public Works Administration, tried
to encourage low-rent housebuilding through limited dividend
corporations. The PWA shifted its emphasis to direct construction,
but was halted by a court decision (U.S. v. Certain Lands in the
City of Louisville (9 F Supp 137)] which held that the federal
government could not use eminent domain power to acquire and clear
slum property to build public housing. State courts, on the other
hand, had judged that state use of eminent domain was justified as
a public use.3 Because the court struck down the.federally-operated
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program, a new program which delegated development power to the
states and localities had to be created in order to further pursue
the federal goal.
The United States Housing Act of 1937 created the United States
Housing Authority (USHA), which would supply money and supervisory
control over Local Housing Agencies (LHA) directly operating the
program in cities. The LHAs were in turn established by state
enabling legislation. The structure of LHAs were determined by
each state. By mandating a national-local system, the federal
legislators decentralized the low-income housebuilding effort and
lost direct control over the implementation of their program
because the Local Housing Authorities developed, owned, and operated
the low-rent projects. The role of the federal supervising agencies,
then, has been restricted to the provision of financial assistance
to the local authorities, the furnishing of technical aid and
advice, and assuring compliance with statutory requirements.
Multiple Goals, Multiple Clients
A report submitted to Congress by the President's Committee
on Planning in 1936 stated "no other undertaking of the federal
government during the last four years holds forth such certain
prospects of business stimulation, economic re-employment, and
social advancement." 4 Such a statement is indicative of the
multiplicity of goals which the federal government had for this
one piece of legislation. Promoters of the Act touted its ability
to stimulate the building industry and employment. Other promoters
presented "facts" that slum clearance and the provision of sanitary
low-rent housing "decreased the danger of epidemics; raised
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general public health; reduced crime; cut juvenile delinquency;
reduced immorality; lowered economic waste by reducing health,
police, and fire protection costs; made better citizens; elimi-
nated fire hazards; increased general land values in the vicinity;
cut the accident rate; prevented the cancerous spread of slums to
infected areas. "5 Senator Wagner, co-sponsor of the bill which
became the Housing Act of 1937 said, "...the moment we eliminate
the slums and put the_-people in better quarters, juvenile delinquency
disappears, crime disappears, disease generated from the slums and
spread to all other sections of the city disappears." 6
The Act would thus "promote the general welfare of the Nation
by employing its funds and credit... to alleviate present and
recurring unemployment..." as well as provide a solution to serious
social problems in cities.7
The building industry, the unemployed workers who would be put
to work building the housing, the general public (now, in theory,
free of the slum conditions which had infected them), and the future
residents of the new standard housing were all considered to be
beneficiaries of the program.
THE HOUSING ACT OF 1937
The future residents were defined only loosely. Except for
stipulations limiting income, based upon local rental market
conditions, the Act says nothing else about the future tenants.
Senator Wagner stated that the intention of the Act was to rehouse
only persons of low income who live in unsanitary, unsafe, and
unhealthful conditions detrimental to morals, health, and safety.8
He also remarked that "people of ill repute would of course not be
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permitted to occupy the premises." 9 The 1937 Act, however, states
neither requirement explicitly. Even if it had done so, with
one-third of a nation ill-housed, living in substandard slum
housing, overcrowded, or financially unable to form households of
their own, the selection mechanism would have had to be further
honed to be operational locally. The legislation addressed only
one of the four major issues of tenant selection: amount of income.
Furthermore, while a limit on the amount of income a tenant could
earn was alluded to, the more difficult matter of defining both
the dollar limit for the locality and the components of family
income was left out of the legislation. The issue of the derivation
of the tenant's income was also omitted, and no decision was made
about whehter or how to consider financial assets in computing
income. The four other major issues of tenant selection were
evaded. Nowhere in the Act is the race of potential tenants
discussed. No order of priorities for choosing among applicants
was described. No criteria for rejection of an applicant were
enumerated, except income and family status. The result of this
absence of explicit tenant selection requirements was to place
decision-making responsibility on the administrative agency and the
Local Housing Authority. It is important to note that the statute
was not the only basis for determining Congressional intent.
Committee Reports were consulted by the regulating agency and
considered part of the legislative history to interpret the statute.
RULES AND REQUIREMENTS
The Housing Act of 1937 evaded the important issues regarding
the distribution of public housing units. Except for limiting the
20
program to families, and to those families in the lowest income
*
group, the Act does not define recipients of the program. The
United States Housing Agency, which administered the program and
was entrusted to develop procedures to implement Congressional
policy, had several options. It could concentrate on procedures
which merely explicated the statute and the legislative history,
ignoring important but neglected issues; it could develop policy
for issues not directly addressed by the law but worthy of federal
policy direction; or it could delegate the authority to Local
Housing Agencies to develop their own policies and procedures,
thereby relinquishing the power to set national standards for
administration.
The USHA did all three. It further defined policy issues,
created new policy, and otherwise left full discretion to the local
agencies.
Perhaps most controversial of its policy setting regulations
was the establishment of the 20% Housing Gap formula. This gap
set maximum income limits for admission to public housing "at
least 20% below the income level at which families of the various
sizes can afford decent, safe, and sanitary housing accomodations
available from private enterprise and appropriate for their use." 1 0
This provision assured that there was always a group of families
whose incomes exceeded the maximum limits, yet by definition could
not afford decent, safe, and sanitary housing on the private market.
"Family" was defined by regulations as a group of persons regularly
together which consisted of two or more persons related by blood,
marriage, or adoption. Unrelated persons or persons living alone
did not constitute a family.
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The USHA also established a system of graded rents. The
distribution of apartments at different rentals, depending upon
the tenant's ability to pay, was developed in order to allow a
cross-section of families of low income to live in public housing
as well as keep federal and local contributions at a low level.
Although only implied in the legislation, the rules required
that families whose incomes exceeded continued occupancy limits
be evicted. The eviction of over-income tenants has been cited as
one of the failures of public housing administration. By forcing
those families whose incomes were high out of public housing,
instability of the development was enhanced. However, if the
program was to be for families of low income, as it was interpreted
at the time, others should have been excluded. Income was defined
more explicitly than in the Act: the regulations listed all
income to be considered as well as deductions. Asset limits were
to be established by the local authority.
The rules and regulations also defined policy. In keeping
with the intentions of the Act as stated by Senator Wagner, the
rules declared that all tenants had to be U.S. citizens and either
have been living under unsafe, unsanitary, or congested housing
conditions (as defined by the local authority); or have been
displaced by a low-rent housing project or "equivalent elimination"
slum clearance, or both. Within each income grade, families
living in the most dangerous housing conditions and displacees
were to be given preference. No direct priority order, however,
was included in the regulations.
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Race is not mentioned in the regulations despite a clause
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of "religious, political,
or other affiliations."ll
While these rules clarified several positions, it is signifi-
cant that issues related to race and criteria for rejection (except
high income) were completely ignored. Income limits, while defined
in the regulations, were based on local conditions. Periodic
management review was established by the regulations to ensure
compliance with the rules and to offer advice and assistance. The
USHA created a loophole for local authorities: the requirements
which were not mandatory provisions under the U.S. Housing Act
might be waived under exceptional circumstances.
-Thus, the original regulations tightened up income definitions,
but in general allowed the local authorities to develop their own
procedures and policy for selecting tenants to live' in public
housing.
WORLD WAR II
Mobilization for the second World War required immediate
housing for servicemen, defense workers, and their families. In
1940, the 76th Congress passed two laws that affected current and
future low-rent public housing. Public Law 671 authorized the use
of loan and subsidy programs of the Housing Act of 1937 for housing
defense and war workers. The "Lanham Act" (P.L.849) authorized
the appropriation of additional funds for the provision of war
housing and community families. Defense workers often did not
meet the low income requirements established under the Housing
Act, but were nonetheless entitled to public housing under P.L. 671.
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Defense workers and servicemen were given top priority for
apartments. Because of this suspension of rules for a national
emergency, many developments which had been built prior to World
War II became temporary housing for non-residents of the
communities in which they were located. The break during the
War was indicative of the precarious nature of the goals of the
public housing system. It had been utilized as a countercyclical
tool for stimulating employment during the Depression, and was
used as a national defense link. The long-term social objective
of improving housing conditions for low-income families was
circumvented temporarily. A special need category (servicemen
and defense workers) was created which supplanted the needs of
poor citizens but served the national objectives during the War.
This special interest category was to be used in the future for
veterans and displacees from urban renewal. In 1942, the USHA was
replaced by the Federal Public Housing Authority as the federal
agency which supervised public housing.
THE HOUSING ACT OF 1949
The social and economic conditions of the nation which neces-
sitated the passage of the Housing Act of 1949 were quite different
from those of 1937. The United States had emerged from the War
with a growing economy. New household formation, at a standstill
during the War, was occurring at rapid rates; the "baby boom"
had begun. Veterans just starting families were unable to find
homes; for nearly two decades the homebuilding industry had been
depressed. Most of these families soon were to be suburban
homeowners due both to the broadening of federal mortgage insurance
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which made it possible for working class families to buy homes and
to the national highway building program. In addition, there was
a perceived need for massive rebuilding of the cities, which had
been neglected since the twenties. The Housing Act of 1949, an
omnibus bill of redevelopment, mortgage guarantees, and public
housing, declared national housing policy for the first time.
This policy addressed not only families of low income, but a
majority of Americans.
National Housing Policy was directed toward achieving "a volume
of housing production and related community development sufficient
to remedy the serious housing shortage, to eliminate slum and
blighted areas, to realize as soon as feasible the goal of a
decent home and suitable living environment for every American
family, to redevelop communities so as to advance the growth and
wealth of the Nation and to enable the housing industry to make its
full contribution toward an economy of maximum employment, produc-
tion, and purchasing power."1 2
With the broadening of other housing options for working class
families, the focus of the public housing program shifted under
the 1949 Act. Public housing was to be for those families displaced
by massive redevelopment, temporarily in great need of housing, or
left behind by the economic recovery of post-War America. The
housing developments were to be cheap and efficient structures with
few amenities.
In keeping with this re-definition, the Housing Act of 1949
circumscribed the selection of tenants more restrictively than did
the 1937 Act. The Amendments of 1949, according to the House
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Banking and Currency Committee, "...leave no doubt whatsoever that
only low-income families will be eligible for public housing."13
It legislated the 20% gap between public housing upper rental
limtis for admission and the rents at which private enterprise is
providing a substantial supply of decent, safe, and sanitary housing.
While this practice had been an administrative policy since the
1937 Act, the inclusion of the "housing gap" as a statutory
provision represented "sound further reassurance that competition
does not and will not exist between public housing and private
enterprise." 1 4 Net income of residents could not exceed five
times the gross rent. If income exceeded the maximaum limits for
continued occupancy, the tenant had to move.
The 1949 Act required that the Local Housing Agency fix maxi-
mum income limits subject to prior approval of the Federal Public
Housing Authority. It required more reporting on tenants accepted
into public housing than previously, including their incomes and
their previous housing conditions.
The Act legislated priorities for selecting tenants from
eligible applicants for the first time. First priority was given
to families that were to be displaced by any public slum-clearance
or redevelopment project. Within this priority, disabled Veterans,
families of deceased Veterans, and families of other Veterans
received priority. Second priority was given to families of
Veterans not displaced by slum clearance or redevelopment. Priority
again was granted to conform with national needs rather than those
of the poorest Americans.
Despite the huge movements of blacks to northern industrial
cities during the War, and a high correlation of race and housing
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conditions (in 1952, 72% of the non-white population occupied
substandard dwellings), the law had no provisions regarding racial
discrimination.
The income stipulations of the Act were no more precise than
they had been in 1937, except for the statutory 20% gap. Local
Housing Agencies were left to develop their own definitions of
income and assets for their cities. Priority order was established
for the first time, and preference within categories of priority
was to be given to those with the most urgent housing needs. The
1949 Act declared that a local authority "shall not discriminate
against families, otherwise eligible for admission, because their
incomes are derived in whole or in part from public assistance,"
thereby eliminating the possibility for rejection of welfare
recipients, but made no other statements about the "character" of
15families who should live in public housing.
RULES AND REGULATIONS
The Federal Public Housing Administration was reorganized in
1947 as the Public Housing Administration within the Housing and
Home Finance Administration (HHFA). The rules and regulations
adopted by HHFA to administer the Act of 1949 basically interpreted
the statute. Rather than merely target priorities for housing
slum dwellers, displacees, or veterans, the HHFA regulations required
that all families admitted meet this standard. It also allowed
families without any housing to be eligible. These families would
be eligible, however, only if they were without housing through no
fault of their own. The definition of "no fault of their own" was
left up to the local authority.
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Regulations as to how to measure the 20% housing gap were
promulgated. However, the procedure published by HHFA was "probably
more restrictive upon public housing than a strict interpretation
of the statute and the implied theoretical measurement would require."l6
When the prescribed measurement was used, the income limits for
public housing were even more stringent than those in the 1949 law,
further lowering the possibility of housing the upper stratum of
lower income families.
HHFA regulations also suggested a score sheet with which to
gauge prior housing conditions. Applicants were to be rated with
respect to: location, condition of structure, water supply,
sewerage system, toilet facilities, bath facilities, lighting,
kitchen facilities, heating, light and ventilation, and overcrowded
conditions. Housing need within the lower income group was thus
evaluated by physical and not social or economic criteria.
Because of the administrative policy to house a cross-section
of the lowest income class, regulations stated that priority
categories were to be exercised within each rent grade. Therefore,
if urban renewal displaced large numbers of families within one
rent grade, not all of them would necessarily be housed.
The policies established by the Housing Act of 1949, which
created dense, cheap housing for the poorest families were put into
practice during the 1950s. A discussion of the results of those
policies follows.
THE FIFTIES
The fifties saw several developments which changed the nature
of much of the country's public housing. One, piiblic housing
28
became an adjunct to the urban renewal program, housing families
displaced by renewal projects in great numbers Two, the "problem
tenant" was discovered. Three, public housing was made available
to elderly single families, and a program of direct loans for
elderly low-rent housing was created. Four, high-rise developments
built on expensive slum land with few amenities became the rule.
Five, the family public housing program was effectively squashed
by small appropriations. This section will discuss these changes
as a means of understanding the directions of tenant selection
stipulations in federal legislation and regulations.
The trends which are described in the following section are
generalizations about central city public housing programs. All
cities had different goals and expectations for their programs and
therefore utilized them somewhat differently.
Urban Renewal
Urban renewal, established under the Housing Act of 1949, and
expanded by the Housing Act of 1954, was a federal program of loans
and grants to cities to clear slum land and package it to sell for
private redevelopment. The urban renewal program had two very
serious spillover effects on the public housing program. First,
urban renewal sites which were not able to be sold to private
investors, but needing clearance, would often be developed as
public housing. The areas which failed to attract private bidders
were generally heavily impacted slum areas with few locational
advantages. These areas were often black districts, and the housing
market for them was limited to black families. Second, urban
renewal displaced great numbers of people. Low-income residential
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neighborhoods were destroyed to provide commercial facilities or
high-priced apartments. By coupling the public housing program
with urban renewal, however, the problem of rehousing displaced
persons could be solved by the new public housing projects. In
fact, the supply of public housing could not meet both the needs
of displacees and of other poor families. Furthermore, it has been
hypothesized that many of the displacees who were housed in public
housing were seriously troubled families.
Problem Tenants
The tenant population of family public housing was changing
drastically during the fifties. Elizabeth Wood, director of the
Chicago Housing Authority, wrote in 1957 that there had been an
"ominous increase in the number of problem families (in public
housing developments) because of (1) priorities given to displacees,
(2) rejection by 'normal' families of public housing because of
the presence of problem families, and (3) unrealistically low
income eligibility requirements."1 7 Wood described problem families
as families with a history of "brawls, narcotics, prostitution,
alcoholism, mental illness or rape." 1 8 Others called these
families "hard core," and the "residue of generations of slum life." 1 9
Whatever they were called, and however ritualistic or class-
biased the definition of such tenants was, by the mid-fifties it
became obvious that the placid, homogeneous days of well-manif'ured
public housing developments occupied by stable working families
were over. The federal policies which encouraged suburban growth
and easily obtainable mortgages also helped to diminish the supply
of "normal" families who wanted to live in public housing.
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Elderly Housing
As public housing began to become the repository for the
problem-poor, Congress sought to rescue one class of poor folk
from the rest. The "worthy" poor had been the original occupants
of public housing. They were hard-working, stable, intact families
trying to better themselves. According to the literature, they
were replaced by "unworthy" poor whose image was welfare-dependent,
shiftless, and immoral. By definition, poor elderly persons were
"worthy." Their image, in contiast to the growing reputation of
family public housing tenants, was that of people who had worked
hard all their lives, lived peacefully and within high moral
standards. The elderly emerged during the 1950s as a special
interest group. The Housing Act of 1956 amended the 1937 Act to
make low-income single elderly persons eligible for admission to
public housing. The requirement regarding previous substandard
housing conditions was waived for them in the 1956 Act. Elderly
persons who met the statutory definition of "family," of course,
had always been eligible for public housing. In most developments,
small units were set aside for these families. Until 1956, a
single elderly person was only allowed to live in public housing
if s/he had initially lived there as part of.a family.
The eligibility of a large group of previously ineligible
persons placed a heavy burden on the existing public housing stock.
Congress never made sufficient appropriations to meet the Housing
Act of 1949's goals. Therefore, the low-income elderly persons
were competing for a very small number of available units.
The growing unpopularity of the family public housing program,
coupled with the recognition of the need of the "worthy" elderly
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poor, led to the enactment of Section 202 of the Housing Act of
1959. This Section created a special program for low-rent Elderly
Housing. Greater subsidies for elderly housing and less restrictive
design limitations were imposed than for family housing.
High-Rise Housing
The proliferation of high-rise housing projects, necessitated
by high central city land costs and overall restraints on per-rocm
construction costs in the 1949 Act, multiplied the problems of
public housing and its tenants. High-rise buildings, with no
frills or amenities, were often completely out of scale and were
socially isolated from the rest of the neighborhood. Families who
were not accustomed to urban living were housed in high-rises,
further complicating their ability to supervise children. Children
with nowhere to play converted elevators into toys, often destroying
them for ordinary use. Elevators, when functioning, became
terribly dangerous places in which to be. Tenants in high-rise
public housing apartments became the primary victims of criminal
activity while police often refused to go into the project buildings
to apprehend wrongdoers. Public housing came to be typified by
the high-rise, high crime institutions built between 1950 and 1955.
Many eligible families, especially in cities where private high-
rise buildings were not common, shied away from the new housing.
Its eyesore quality made it even more difficult to sell to
communities outside the central city. Because new building was
concentrated in slum neighborhoods, working class families from
other sections of the city who qualified for public housing chose
not to apply.
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Appropriations
The 1949 Act required annual appropriations for public housing
construction. The 1949 Act declared that Congress intended to fund
135,000 units a year for six years. First, the Korean War limited
production. Later, the Eisenhower administration and a fiscally
and socially conservative Congress limited appropriations to a
fraction of what had been intended. In the fifties, public housing
appropriations never reached 50,000 units per year. From 1955-60,
never more than 22,000 units per year were completed.2 0
The limitation of production of public housing units was
indicative of the national leadership's viewpoint toward public
housing. Indeed, housing programs did not get much attention again
until the War on Poverty during the 1960s.
ISSUES
The legislation and rules and regulations of the fifties
further defined some of the four major issues of tenant selection
but neglected others. In the late fifties, Congress eliminated
tenant selection requirements from national legislation and
restated its intention to encourage local self-determination in
tenant selection.
Race
The issue of racial discrimination was not explicitly handled
in the laws during this period or in regulations, but the continu-
ation of racially segregated projects was an underlying assumption
of both. The contract which the federal government and the Local
Housing Agency wrote to negotiate financial arrangements for a
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new development (Annual Contributions Contract) specified the race
of intended occupants. Management Handbooks published by HHFA
referred to "parts of the program which are not available to all
races...",21 in describing administrative procedures.
In a subtle manner, blacks were given priority for public
housing by the granting of priority to displacees. Since urban
renewal in some cities was largely a program of redeveloping black
central city areas, and public housing building was largely in
black districts during the fifties, giving priority status to
displacees favored blacks. Furthermore, if preference were given
to those families in the worst housing condition, as stated by
the 1949 Act, blacks would also theoretically have a better chance
of getting an apartment.
Income
Income limits were set by the Local Housing Authority through-
out the decade. The 1957 Housing Act enumerated deductions from
income. The 1957 Handbook, published by HHFA and distributed to
LHAs, suggested that, in view of the special hardships faced by
displaced families, income limits for displacees might well be
made somewhat higher than for others. Local Housing Authorities
continued to make their own asset limits. Income limits for
elderly persons were set higher than family limits by an HHFA
regulation in 1956.
Priority Order
The order of priority for housing eligible families was well-
defined in the Housing Act of 1949, but redefined by the rules of
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of HHFA. The law gave priority to displacees and those living in
unsafe, unsanitary, or overcrowded homes. The regulations required
all tenants to meet these requirements. Veterans and elderly
persons, however, were exempt from having to be displacees or
residents of substandard housing. Neither the rules nor the laws,
however, set priorities which could be easily implemented. The
Local Housing Authority still had to decide how the eligible
families would be rated on the urgency of their housing need.
While previous housing conditions of applicants were verified by
the LHA, there was no federally imposed rank order which determined,
for example, whether a family living in overcrowded conditions must
be housed after a family with no home, or whether a family with no
hot water ought to get preference over a family living in a
condemned house. The HHFA made suggestions to LHAs on how to
measure housing need, but none of these suggestions were mandatory.
The determination of housing need and the order in which applicants
would be housed was left to the LHA.
Basis for Rejection
The Housing Act of 1949 and regulations which followed were
explicit about one category of family which could not be rejected:
public welfare recipients. In 1952, the Gwinn Amendment stated
that members of subversive organizations could not live in public
housing. However, any other limitations as to who was not to be
housed was left to the local authority. The federal government
refused to make the choice of who should be excluded or included
from the public housing program.
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The Housing Act of 1959 made a declaration of policy: local
public housing agencies were to be given the maximum amount of
responsibility in the administration of the program "including
the responsibility for the establishment of rents and eligibility
requirements (subject to the approval of the Public Houisng
Administration) with due consideration to accomplishing the objec-
tives of the public housing law..."22 This statutory declaration
of policy, in practice since the beginning of the program, served
two purposes. First, it restated the principle of local autonomy.
Second, more negatively, it represented Congress's further
retraction from the program. Appropriations had been cut to a
bare minimum for family projects. Withdrawal from making policy
for Local Housing Authorities to follow shifted the burden from
the federal government in an era when public housing had begun to
fail.
A change in this situation came in the sixties with tremendous
pressure from outside the Congress and housing bureaucracy.
THE SIXTIES
Increasing national awareness of the existence of racial
discrimination and poverty in the United States led to the Civil
Rights movement, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the host of
anti-poverty programs under President Johnson's administration.
The federal anti-poverty programs which promoted legal assistance
for the poor facilitated the codification of rights for public
housing tenants. Practices that had been prevelant at the local
authority level, such as screening out unwed mothers or evicting
a tenant with little or no, notice, were attacked in court.
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Local Housing Authorities, in part because of the lack of
federal supervision or control, had developed procedures which
were capricious and arbitrary. Local Housing Authorities were
superseded in the sixties first by the courts and then by the
federal supervising agencies. The federal government developed
rules to standardize many previously discretionary procedures of
local authorities. The Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment outlined the aspects of rights of public housing tenants to
notification of their status, established grievance procedures,
long-term leases, and protection against eviction. For the first
time, the federal bureaucracy intervened in the practices of LHAs
by establishing standard rents and requiring a federally-imposed
tenant selection plan. The sixties was a period when much control
over the operation of LHAs was taken out of their hands and given
to federal agencies and the poor themselves.
LEGISLATION
Race
Race became a paramount issue in the sixties. Discrimination
in housing was a major component of the Civil Rights struggle.
Public housing became part of a crusade for desegregation. Indeed,
because it was built with federal money and regulated by the
federal government, it was argued that the public housing program
had a special duty to pioneer the integration of the races. The
history of public housing indicates that it avoided that challenge.
The localities may have been prevented from doing so by local
pressure; however, the federal government certainly did not provide
guidance or imperative action until after the program had been
operating on a segregated basis for 25 years.
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In 1962, President KRennedy issued an Executive Order entitled
"Equal Opportunity in Housing." The Order declared that discri-
mination on the basis of race, color, creed, or national origin
to deny any American the benefits of housing financed with federal
financial assistance was illegal because such discrimination acted
to "deprive many Americans of equal opportunity in the exercise of
their inalienable rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness." 2 3 The Order applied only to newly constructed public
housing (as well as any other housing financed or insured by the
federal government), and while enforcement procedures were outlined
in the Order, they were not implemented.
The Civil Rights Act two years later superseded the Executive
Order. The Act (PL 77-352) had major implications for public
housing. Title VI declared that "no person in the United States
shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
federal financial assistance." 2 4
These two statements of federal policy were intended to reverse
the 25 year policy of separate but equal facilities for the races.
The regulations created by the Department of Housing and Urban
Development to implement the law are a good example of the mismatch
of legislation to regulations. They also represent the increasing
control of local procedures by the federal government.
Income
Public housing legislation in the 1960s probably did not
impact the tenant mix in existing housing projects as much as the
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new housing programs of the Johnson administration (e.g., S.221 (d)
(3), 235, 236, rent supplements, S. 23 leasing program). In an
effort to establish more vertical equity in federal housing
assistance, programs for moderate-income rental housing and low-
income homeownership were established. The buildings constructed
under these programs drained the low-income public housing projects
of families which were often high rent payers. The exodus of many
working families to other housing opportunities and of the "trouble
free" elderly tenants to elderly housing led to increased turnover
and vacancies in some, generally the worst, housing developments.
New residents often had very low incomes, and it became difficult
for local authorities to maintain their operating income without
raising rents beyond the means of these tenants.
The continued occupancy policy was gradually changed during
this period. The 1949 Act had stated that families whose income
exceeded the continued occupancy limits must be evicted. In
1961, the eviction policy, considered by many a harsh and destruc-
tive policy, was made more lenient to allow overincome families to
stay if they were unable to locate adequate private housing. With
the revision of overincome policy, the Congress had begun to
recognize that public housing was becoming a community of the very
poor and had to offer something positive to its higher income
tenants in order for them to stay. If the trends had not been
toward poorer and poorer applicants and tenants, the rescission
of the overincome clause would not have been possible, due to
opposition by private housing providers.
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The Housing and Urban Development Act of 1969 represented a
major shift to federal jurisdiction of rent determination. The
"Brooke Amendment" equalized rent payment as a proportion of
income. No family would pay more than 25% of its income for pu,blic
housing rent. Before the Brooke Amendment was passed, families
receiving welfare benefits paid a flat rent for their apartments
in many cities. The rent was often an inordinately large propor-
tion of income and could be as high as 50% of income. However,
higher-paid working families paid closer to 20% of their salaries
in rent. The Brooke Amendment generally raised rents for working
families and lowered them for welfare recipients. In all, the
Brooke Amendment caused a net loss in operating revenue to local
authorities; Congress appropriated $75 million to cover existing
operating deficits and to make up for the loss of income.
This amendment usurped the local authority's power to determine
rents, directly contradicting the 1959 policy statement which
asserted that the local housing agency had the responsibility for
establishing rent and eligibility requirements. A federal
definition of income, however, was not further refined until 1970,
despite the standardization of rents as a proportion of income.
Priority Order
Priority order under the legislation changed as well. The
Housing Act of 1959 eliminated the explicit ordering of priorities
and left it up to the LHA to adopt admission policies that incor-
porated the priorities of the Act of 1949. When the tenant selection
and assignment directives were written by the Department of Housing
and Urban Development in the late sixties, the priority order for
applicants was eliminated.
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Basis for Rejection
Major changes in the public housing program were spearheaded
by lawsuits against local authorities' practices of tenant
selection. Prior to the mid-60s, local authorities viewed
themselves as having the status of private landlords. They
rejected applicants on the basis of their moral behavior or previous
police records or rent paying ability. Court cases, however,
determined that housing authorities could no longer deny admission
to any applicant because of their moral behavior. Cole v.
Housing Authority of Newport [435 F 2nd 807) struck down lengthy
local residency requirements which had often been imposed by
LHAs.
The Act of 1969 legislated some rights of due process for
applicants. Under Section 214 of the Act, Local Housing Authorities
were required to give applicants prompt notice of eligibility and
provide a hearing for any applicant found ineligible. This
requirement was a departure from ordinary practice of merely
placing undesirable applicants' files at the back of the pile.
Although the law did not impose any eligibility requirements
nor categorically eliminate reasons for rejection, the rules and
regulations were more explicit. The federal government, if only
in accordance with the courts, was forced to make a clear statement
of who could not be rejected from public housing. It did so in
its rules and regulations.
Two additional categories of eligible applicants were created
during this period by the Housing Act of 1964. Single non-elderly
people would be admitted if they were handicapped or displaced.
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These two categories have been the last additions to the list of
eligible applicants since 1937.
RULES AND RULES
During the first half of the 1960s, the federal bureaucracy,
adhering to the Congressional policy of local autonomy as stated
in 1959, left the implementation of the public housing acts to the
local authorities. The local authorities, as quoted in a 1965
Management Handbook, "have had many years of experience under
these federal requirements and should be relied, upon to be compe-
tent and fair; there is no question that they are in a much better
position than the federal government to ascertain the myriad
factors that may be involved in a particular situation and to
determine their proper weight."2 5 However, the federal government
continued to require the local authorities to give "full consideration
to their governmental responsibility for the rehousing of those
displaced by urban renewal or other governmental action and to the
special categories presently in federal law: veterans, servicemen
and their families; the elderly and disabled; those living in
slums; those most urgently in need of re-housing; and families
on relief." 2 6
Until 1965, the local authorities could write their own tenant
selection plan with little interference by the Public Housing
Administration of HHFA.
The continuing existence of racially segregated public housing
developments could not be tolerated under the Civil Rights Act.
Tenant selection and assignment procedures had to conform with the
nondiscrimination provisions of the Act. HHFA issued a circular
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in 1965 which began to shift the nature of the federal-local
relationship on this issue. The circular required a local authority
to choose one of two acceptable tenant assignment plans. The
authority could (1) establish a single waiting list for the city
and assign the next available vacancy to the applicant next in
line ("first come, first served"); or (2) have separate waiting
lists for each project ("freedom of choice"). Assignments were to
be made without regard to race, color or national origin of the
existing residents of a project or the applicant. The local
authority could apply for a waiver of this new plan if the vacancy
rate in each of its developments had not exceeded 5% and substantial
desegregation already existed.
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act stated "no person in the
United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national
origin.. .be subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving federal financial assistance." The new assign-
ment policy was meant to alter the assignment policy at the local
level which directed white applicants to white projects and black
applicants to black projects. The new policy was, in theory,
uniformly nondiscriminatory. If the applicant whose name reached
the top of the list were offered the next available vacancy, without
regard to race, then the Civil Rights Act would not be violated.
By the same token, under the freedom of choice plan, a family
could choose which development they wished to live in, and could
not be denied the opportunity to live in a development where
another race predominated.
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The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) was
created in 1965. By 1967, it began flexing its cabinet-level
muscles on the issue of tenant selection and assignment. HUD
found that the "freedom of choice" plans did not provide applicants
with free access to all projects regardless of race. Because the
projects were clearly segregated, members of one race did not
request an apartment in projects populated by another race.
Therefore the freedom of choice plan resulted in a continuation of
previous segregated occupancy patterns. In additdon, some projects
occupied by one race had a substantial number of vacancies even
though applicants of another race were on a waiting list for other
projects. Specifically, all-white projects went begging for tenants
while substantial numbers of blacks remained on other projects'
waiting lists. This pattern was especially prevelant in the South.
Because HUD was not pleased with the desegregation efforts
that had been attempted by the local authorities to date, in 1967
it published a second set of regulations on nondiscrimination in
housing. This time it required the establishment of one waiting
list and offered the choice of two methods of administration:
(1) the applicant had to accept the vacancy offered or be moved to
last place on the eligible applicant list, or (2) if a suitable
vancy in more than one location existed, the applicant was to be
offered the unit at the location that contained the largest number
of vacancies; if s/he rejected that offer, s/he was to be offered
a suitable unit at the location containing the next highest number
of vancies. If the applicant rejected three such offers, s/he was
to be placed at the bottom of the eligible waiting list. This
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second plan became known as the 1-2-3 rule. The 1-2-3 rule was
intended to create racially blind assignment procedures.
The 1-2-3 rule was the first real federal attempt to interfere
in local authorities' tenant selection practices. The mechanism
which it created to enforce the Civil Rights Act was unacceptable
to many cities. HUD's attempt to make a match between policy and
procedures hardly guaranteed integration. Projects with the
highest turnover and vacancy rates, regardless of the race of their
occupants, have generally been the worst projects in the city's
stock; often the largest developments; and the places where
unwanted families of all races have been "dumped." Such places,
epitomizing the bankruptcy of the public housing community, were
not necessarily the best places to pioneer integration. Only the
most desperate families, with no other viable options, would accept
the offer of such projects.
The 1-2-3 rule invited non-compliance by Local Housing
Authorities. The rule assumed that all public housing units were
alike, although it was clear at the local level that this
assumption was untrue. A LHA could not always neglect the
differencesxinuunits in its assignment practices.
Furthermore, after thirty years of federal non-involvement
in tenant selection, the local authorities had set up their own
systems for selection and assignment. LHAs resented or obstructed
the imposition of federal rules and granted exceptions from them
for the families who, by nature of their "character" should go to
the "good" projects. As a result, the 1-2-3 rule, if implemented
at all, was only implemented selectively and therefore did not
achieve the equity it aimed for.2 7
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The National Association of Housing and Redevelopment Officials
(NAHRO), in fact, opposed the plan. NAHRO was not at all sure
whether the 1-2-3 rule would accomplish desegregation. Indeed,
because the system was color blind, it might be expected to create
more imbalance. 2 8 NAHRO' s position was to be expected because it
represented the Local Housing Authorities. Their objections were
heard. With the arrival of the Nixon administration and the
departure of HUD Secretary Robert C. Weaver, HUD lost the political
will to enforce the 1-2-3 rule. Some housing officials would
maintain that HUD has never made a serious attempt to desegregaLe
public housing.
Income
The policies of the 1950s toward income were also upset by
the 1-2-3 rule. If applicants were housed simply on a first come,
first served basis, they would not necessarily be of the correct
income range to keep the project on an even financial keel. Given
the generally low incomes of the families applying, the operating
income of local authorities were quickly becoming insufficient.
This trend toward lower income families was exacerbated by the
Brooke Amendment, for those families with the lowest income, with
the fewest opportunities on the private market were further
encouraged to enter public housing.
The local authority still had the power to set income limits,
subject to federal approval. The 20% housing gap was still in the
statutes, but most local authorities had not done a housing gap
study for years. As a result, income limits were often quite low.
The federal government suggested that the LHA consider placing
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reasonable limits on assets for admission and continued occupancy,
but did not set national policy on that issue.
In accordance with the 1961 legislation allowing overincome
families to remain in low-rent projects if they could not find
suitable housing, the regulations required that the local authorities
help overincome families locate adequate housing. By 1969, local
authorities were instructed to establish continued occupancy limits
high enough that families exceeding the limits would be able to
find suitable housing.
Priority Order
Specific priority order was eliminated in 1961. However, the
regulations advised the LHA to give "full consideration to its
responsibility for the rehousing of displaced families, to the
applicant's status as a serviceman or veteran, and to the applicant's
age or disability, housing conditions, urgency of housing need, and
source of income." 2 9 The LHA could do so by continuing priority
and eligibility criteria used previously, or it could eliminate or
change priority categories. The federal government's interest in
granting priority status to "special interest" groups, such as
veterans or displacees, had waned. Veterans no longer represented
a large percentage of low-income families. Large-scale urban
renewal had diminished in importance, so displacees were less
numerous. Until the 1-2-3 rule, the LHA could allocate its vacancies
to applicants with the most serious housing need, to veterans, or
to disabled persons. With the imposition of the 1-2-3 rule,
however, all federally-imposed priority categories were eliminated.
47
Apartments were to be distributed in chronological order; the LHA
could grant priority to families in specific circumstances as long
as no racial discrimination was inherent in the priorities.
Basis for Rejection
In December, 1968, HUD promulgated a circular entitled
"Admission and Continued Occupancy Regulations for Low Rent Housing."
This circular reported recent court cases and set minimum admission
and continued occupancy standards for local authorities. The
circular stated that the courts had ruled that while a Local
Housing Agency had the right and responsibility to establish
standards for admission that would protect the health, safety,
morals, and comfort of public housing tenants, an authority could
not deny admission or occupancy to a family based on a moral
judgment or solely on the basis of the presence of an out-of-
wedlock child.3 0
The circular developed the following standards:
(a) The LHA must protect the applicant's right of privacy
and constitutional rights;
(b) The LHA should not establish policies which automatically
deny admission or continued occupancy to a particular
class, such as unmarried mothers, families having one
or more children born out of wedlock, families having
police records or poor rent-paying habits, etc.;
(c) the LHA could establish criteria and standards bearing
on whether the conduct of such tenants does or would be
likely to interfere with other tenants in such a manner
as to materially diminish their enjoyment of the premises.
Such interference must relate to the actual or threatened
conduct of the tenant and not be based solely on such
matters as the marital status of the family, the legiti-
macy of the children, police records, etc.;
(d) the applicant was to be the major source of information.
The LHA would request only such information which was
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required and applicants were to be treated with
courtesy and consideration at all times.
With the passage of the Housing and Urban Development Act of
1969, Local Housing Authorities were required to notify ineligible
applicants of their status and provide an informal hearing on that
determination. Prior to the enactment of this provision, not only
were applicants sometimes rejected for specious reasons, but they
were often never told of their ineligibility. The establishment
of a strong lease in the seventies was the result of a national
outcry for rights for public housing tenants; the month-to-month
lease which had been recommended by the federal government
previously was abandoned in favor of longer term leases (usually
one year) which stated the tenants' rights to grievance procedures
as well as protection against eviction.
In summary, the 1960s saw the official diminution of the Local
Housing Authorities' discretion with regard to whom they could
choose as tenants, where they would be housed, and how they would
be treated as tenants. The federal government in Washington and,
more directly, in the regional offices of the Department of Housing
and Urban Development gained power on paper and threatened to
punish noncompliance by withdrawing money in the future.
THE SEVENTIES
The Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 has been the
only major housing legislation of any importance passed to date
during the seventies. The public housing provisions of the Act,
and the regulations which implement them, aim at reversing the
previous trends of public housing without offering the means to
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accomplish such a renaissance. While Congress certainly has
recognized that public housing is the home of the nation's poorest
and often most troubled citizens, it offers few curatives for the
disintegration of the program and no incentives to families other
than the very poor to choose public housing. The Act and its
regulations, while restating the problems of public houisng and its
tenants, do not usher in the drastic measures needed to solve them.
Meager funding appropriations contribute to public housing's
continued decline.
LEGISLATION
Race
Segregated public housing developments continue to exist in
most cities. Many family developments which appear integrated on
paper are undergoing racial change from white to black and Hispanic
as the numbers of white applicants has diminished. Fewer white
families are opting for public housing. Efforts at integration
have often resulted in the flight of white families from previously
all-white projects to substandard private housing. Public housing,
like public schools in central cities, is an arena in which those
families with other options buy their way out of the public system.
Race becomes a catalyst. Federally-imposed racially blind proce-
dures established in the sixties have given way to racially-conscious
ones at the local level which attempt to balance the integration
of developments. But the legislation of 1974, except for perfunctory
quotes from the Civil Rights Act and statements of non-discrimination,
said nothing new about race and public housing. The gap between
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the legislation and regulations and the reality of public housing
is severe. Racial integration has not been accomplished by the
1-2-3 rule, yet the Act does not attempt to rectify this situation.
Income
Congress has been quick to recognize that public housing is
expensive to operate because tenants' incomes are so low. With
the rent provisions contained in the Brooke Amendment, the revenues
of local authorities declined and the federal government was
therefore required to make up the difference by granting operating
subsidies in addition to annual contributions. Thus it was in the
interest of economy not to raise subsidies, but to insure that
public housing tenants were not only the very poor. The legislation
of 1974 required Local Housing Agencies to establish tenant
selection criteria to assure that, in a reasonable time period,
each project would include families with a broad range of incomes
and would avoid concentrations of low-income and deprived families
with serious social problems. 3 1
In order to encourage this income mixing, the 20% "housing
gap" was eliminated so authorities could theoretically raise their
income limits. Income limits for the new leasing program (Section
8 of the 1974 Act) were much higher than the income limits for
most cities' public housing programs. The program, which was meant
to allow low-income families to rent apartments in privately owned
buildings but pay lower rent, was transformed to a moderate-income
housing program. Public housing limits might easily follow suit.
Income limits for continued occupancy were deleted entirely.
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The elimination of requirements which insured that public
housing was for very low-income people indicated that private
housing interests no longer saw public housing as a threat. Indeed,
many if not most public housing developments have been unable to
attract moderate-income households at all. It seems unlikely that
many developments will be populated with large numbers of moderate-
income families in the near future. The Act required that at least
20% of the dwelling units in every project be occupied by families
who have incomes less than 50% of the area median income. Yet the
intent of the legislation is clear: public housing should be
geared to working families again.
The 1974 Act also established a minimum rent (5% of gross
income). The Brooke Amendment and the statutory definition of
income which followed in the 1970 Housing and Urban Development
Act had allowed a number of tenants to pay zero rent. In addition,
many state welfare agencies had decreased rent benefits for public
housing tenants when their rent had been lowered. An emergency
housing resolution in 1971 required that this practice cease. The
1974 Act stated that tenants would be required to pay either their
welfare benefits earmarked for shelter or 5% or gross income,
whichever was higher.
Priority
Priority order was not re-established by the Act of 1974. It
remained up to the local authorities to determine priorities.
Who Shall Not Be Housed
The Act required that local authorities develop tenant selection
criteria which avoid the concentration of deprived families with
J;7
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serious social problems. The regulations which followed the Act
clarified, to some extent, how those families might be evaluated.
The statute itself, however, does not make any inference to how
those families with "serious social problems" might be distributed
within or eliminated from the public housing program.
REGULATIONS
Because the legislature was not willing to define its vague
sociological terms, HUD was left to develop procedures to effectuate
the income and social mix that the 1974 Act mandated.
Race
The 1-2-3 rule is still in effect. No new regulations have
been promulgated which rescind it or propose an alternate plan.
Regional HUD officials, however, have not enforced its implementation
with great zeal. While race and racial turnover has remained a
major issue in public housing, the intensity of other serious
crime, maintenance, and management problems have obscured the
enforcement of the mid-60's policies and ideals of equal opportunity.
Income
The Department of Housing and Urban Development regulations
predated the legislative mandate which altered the inccme stipula-
tions for public housing tenants. In 1971, HUD published a circular
entitled "Housing a Cross Section of Low-Income Families in Low
Rent Public Housing." HUD was concerned over the "excessively high
operating costs and, in some instances, deplorable deterioration
of the environment in which tenants live. Sharp increases in
vandalism and crime, accompanied by the moveout of many families
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still eligible and in need of public housing, have resulted in
either, or both, high vacancy rates or concentrations of the
lowest income families, many with serious problems." 3 2
The regulation allowed the LHA to grant preference to
applicants who ensured the financial solvency and stability of the
program. It required the LHA to take steps to stimulate applica-
tions from wage-earning and two-parent families.
With the statutory inclusion of the need to balance public
housing projects in the 1974 Act, the regulations further
elucidated how the local authority could screen tenants within
legal bounds. However, no regulations have been promulgated which
suggest a method of stimulating demand among higher income families
for public housing, nor has HUD required a certain type of
assignment plan which is income-related. Notably absent is the
huge modernization and other monies that might make public housing
more attractive to higher income families.
Priority Order
Priority order has been neglected in the HUD guidelines.
Local authorities can develop their own priorities. The establish-
ment of priorities is not a small privilege. By defining special
categories of public housing applicants, the local authority can
effectively house only the people who meet those cateogires. As
was the case during the sixties, the LHA can base its priority
system, if it chooses to establish one, on need or special interest.
The LHA can develop any system of priorities as long as it is not
racially based.
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Basis for Rejection
HUD rules regarding ineligible applicants in the sixties were
elaborated in the regulations for the Housing and Community
Development Act of 1974. The elimination of some categories for
rejection in 1968 had resulted in the elimination of any screening
of applicants by.many local authorities.
The regulations established that a local authority could reject
an applicant if s/he (or a member of the applicant's family):
(1) has a record of nonpayment of rent, unless the nonpayment
was due to excessive cost;
(2) has a record of disturbance of neighbors, destruction
of property, or housekeeping which would, if exhibited
in public housing, interfere with other tenants' health,
safety, security of welfare, or the physical environment;
(3) has a history of criminal activity which, if exhibited
while a tenant, would materially diminish the other
tenants' enjoyment of the premises by adversely effecting
their health, safety, or security, or the physical
environment. (This category includes crimes of physical
violence to persons or property, possession or sale of
narcotics, etc.)
The local authority is allowed to ask the applicant to provide
personal references which the LHA can check. Some states prohibit
the LHA from getting police records. A non-discrimination clause
which requires that all reject'ions should pertain to the individual,
and not to his/her race, creed, religion, national origin, marital
status, etc., was included in the regulation.
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The "screening" outlined by the regulations is to refuse
admission only to applicants who would make life miserable for
other tenants and thereby make public housing a dangerous and
frustrating experience. Yet the basis upon which this determina-
tion is made if fragile at best. Should the LHA trust the opinions
of the applicant's neighbors or landlord? How can the authority
tell if there are mitigating factors which warrant giving the
family a second chance? Local authorities had handled the problem
in the past by denying admission to everyone in certain categories
in addition to the kinds of categories which are enumerated in the
regulations. The regulations are less ritualistic but also more
subjective. If the applicant feels the judgment is unfair, s/he
can appeal the decision to the authority, and s/he must be informed
of the decision in the first place. But can the federal
government guarantee against abuse of the discretion placed at the
local level? Unless it monitors each decision, no supervising
agency can guarantee objectivity or equity. But it can make efforts
to do so. It can establish oversight panels or occasional audits,
for example.
The problem of supervision by HUD of LHA practices extends
beyond screening. It includes the supervision of hiring, contracting,
desegregation attempts, etc. The philosophy of local self-
government has led to HUD's non-involvement in most areas of public
housing. But, as described above, tne locus of power over
implementation appears to be shifting to Washington.
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SUMMARY
This history of tenant selection legislation and regulations
has shown that the federal government has become increasingly
involved in the implementation of the public housing program since
the enactment of the Housing Act of 1937. Before the 1960s, the
federal government restricted intervention to two areas of tenant
selection. First, it roughly defined eligibility income for Local
Housing Authorities. Second, it defined priority categories for
applicants which corresponded to nationally perceived needs, such
as housing veterans of World War II.
By the 1960s, two other major issues demanded national
attention. Racial discrimination in housing gained prominence as
a practice needing rectification, and the federal government
attempted to eliminate racial discrimination in the administration
of the public housing program. Secondly, arbitrary rejection of
applicants practiced by Local Housing Authorities was eliminated
by the imposition of federal rules and grievance procedures to
guarantee their enforcement.
This increasing involvement has standardized some procedures
of local authorities, but it has also highlighted several paradoxes
of federal intervention. These paradoxes can be summarized in the
four issues of tenant selection.
Race
The increased federal enforcement of Equal Opportunity in
Housing, as symbolized by the 1-2-3 rule, has helped to increase
segregation of public housing rather than eliminate it. Rapid
integration of previously all-white demelopments has led to many
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whites leaving the system entirely. The problem has been compounded
by the fact that this rapid integration took place in developments
with the highest turnover and most problems to begin with.
Experience has shown that white families' effective demand for
public housing has decreased as the proportion of black public
housing residents in the city increased. Such a phenomenon is
troublesome if a LHA wants to maintain options for the white poor
who need public housing. As the system becomes more and more
minority-dominated, it no longer serves the purposes of integration
nor does it serve the needs of low-income white families who choose
not to live in predominantly minority housing developments. In
addition, the existence of all-minority housing developments in
all-white neighborhoods, expedited by the domination of minority
applicants on waiting lists, might either encourage white desertion
of the surrounding neighborhood or engender racial hostility toward
public housing and its tenants within the neighborhood.
Income
The Brooke Amendment and its provisions for supplementing the
operating income of LHAs have made it possible for very low-income
families to live in public housing without spending a large
proportion of their income for rent. While making it easier for
these families to afford public housing, however, the Brooke
Amendment encouraged the departure of working families, for it
raised their rents. The tradeoff has become clear to tenants and
local authorities as their services have decreased due to the loss
of operating income. The federal government has, in the Housing
and Community Development Act of 1974, tried to re-establish public
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housing as a community of families with a range of low incomes.
However, as it has become more expensive for working families to
live in public housing, they have opted out of the public housing
market. Therefore, after removing the burden from very low-income
tenants and the local authorities, the federal government has tried
to encourage LHAs to attract working low-income families. Given
the physical and social state of most public housing developments,
attracting working families will be a difficult task. In addition,
inasmuch as working higher-income families take the place of very
poor families, unless new housing stock is added, most very poor
families will not be served by the public housing program. This
trend would represent a retrenchment in accomplishing the social
goals of the program.
Priority Order
The federal government has ceased to impose specific priorities
for selecting tenants. When it has in the past, the categories of
priority have not been categories which necessarily pertained to
housing need or poverty. During World War II, the federal
government required priority to be granted to defense workers and
servicemen. After the War, veterans received priority. As the
urban renewal program gained momentum, displacees from urban renewal
and public housing projects were granted priority.
Local Housing Authorities have often established their own
priority order in allocating units, despite the absence of federal
restrictions. While the first-come, first-served order of the
1-2-3 rule has been in effect, a "special need" category has been
established by the local officials. The existence of loopholes in
the 1-2-3 rule will be discussed further in Chapter V.
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Basis for Rejection
Local authorities had almost complete discretion over the
rejection of some applicants until the mid-sixties. Often, this
discretion was abused by LHAs. After the federal government
imposed rules which limited this discretion, many housing authorities
neglected to screen any applicants from public housing. Public
housing became housing for everyone. However, by housing everyone
who applied, the tenant population was not well-served. Greater
equity for all families has resulted in a preponderance of families
with severe social problems. Many of these tenants have caused
stable families, unable to control their surroundings any longer,
to leave public housing. The public housing population, desperate
as it is in terms of financial resources, has also had to cope with
violent criminals, drug dealers and addicts, and the like, as a
result of the elimination of screening. The Housing and Community
Development Act of 1974 has created guidelines to allow local
authorities to begin to screen tenants again, but given the legal
limitations on information, local officials claim that screening
will be very difficult.
As the public housing program has aged, it has developed into
exactly the kind of slums which the 1937 Act intended to replace
with decent, safe, and sanitary housing. Many public housing
developments are neither decent, safe, nor sanitary. The submerged
middle class no longer chooses public housing. In recent years,
the federal government has become more involved in the local
operation of the program. Federal direction did help to prevent
abusive practices of local authorities which limited the distribution
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of public housing. However, few resources were provided which
helped LHAs to function under the new rules. LHAs had to develop
screening procedures which would be legally defensible. They had
to obey new regulations regarding racial patterns in public housing
which violated common sense. Federal bureaucrats could not
administer the program from Washington, yet the increasing control
by HUD implied that they intended to do so.
The history of federal involvement in establishing laws and
rules and regulations is only one aspect of the implementation of
the public housing program. The gap between the federal rules and
local implementation of the program will be discussed in the
following chapters.
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CHAPTER III
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS: LOCAL SCENERY
The stage was set in Washington for the public housing
program. A multiplicity of interests and goals, as well as a
philosophy of local autonomy led to rules of operation that were
flexible, vague, or non-existent for the first thirty years of
the program. The lack of concreteness of rules was based upon
the presumption that each locality was different; a flexible
program would allow each city and town to tailor the national
program to its own needs. The political climate and the demo-
graphic history of the city are essential links to understanding
the process of implementation.
This chapter will examine some relevant political and
demographic aspects of the City of Cambridge which contributed to
the development of Cambridge public housing.
Cambridge has had a Plan E (weak mayor/city manager) form of
government since 1942. The City Council is elected on a city-wide
basis on a proportional representation ballot. The nine-member
City Council in turn selects a mayor from its ranks. The Council
elections are not partisan contests. Rather, candidates distin-
guish themselves as liberals (endorsed by the Cambridge Civic
Association) or conservative ethnic politicians (Independents).
The liberals, who usually win four seats on the Council, get their
support from the "Brattle Street Crowd" (wealthy "good government"
voters), students and young people, and minority voters. The
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Independents' constituents have been working class and poor ethnic
residents (largely Italian and Irish), property owners, and
conservative voters. The Independents generally win a majority of
the Council seats. The two groups should be viewed as representing
different social classes with different agendas.
Cambridge politics can be viewed as a balancing between
establishment liberals (characterized by rule-making and reformist
idealism) and ethnic conservatives (characterized by patronage and
ward politicking). Every branch of the government is "controlled"
by a different group. The Police Department, Public Works
Department, School Department, Recreation Department, etc. are each
run by the Italians, the Irish, or the liberals. The Housing
Authority has played a role in that balancing of power.
The Cambridge Housing Authority was established in 1937 under
state enabling legislation to operate the low-rent public housing
program in Cambridge. A five-member Board of Commissioners sets
policy for the Executive Director and his staff to implement. The
Board is appointed for staggered terms. Four members are appointed
by the City Manager, subject to the confirmation by City Council,
and one is appointed by the Governor.
Before the city manager system was adopted in 1942, the mayor
appointed CHA Commissioners. The Boards were "blue ribbon"
committees of liberal professionals with a sense of civic pride
and little personal involvement with tenants. In the early fifties,
a shift began in the Board. It became composed of people who were
more responsive to and representative of the City Council and
Cambridge politics in general. The character of the Board shifted
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from liberal to conservative. Because the Council had to approve
nominations made by the City Manager, the politics of the CHA
Board also shifted. Board members were appointed if they did or
promised sufficient favors to enough councillors to win their votes.
Board members therefore became political figures in their own right.
They were more directly dependent upon the Council than they were
on national supervising agencies for policy and procedural
direction. As they became powerful, the Board's conservative
ethnic style became the operating mode for CHA.
Greenstone and Peterson stated, "in the decentralized American
political system, the impact of federal policy can be blunted by
established local elites, political, economic, and bureaucratic,
unless the latter are themselves committed to the program."1 I
would argue that the change in the composition of the Board from
concerned citizens to politically motivated appointees and the
deterioration of public housing which accompanied it represented
the shift in commitment of the city in general to the public
housing program.
The City Council, the Board, the CHA staff, and the community
were committed to the public housing program for many years. It
was a nationally funded way to solve a disturbing social and
economic problem for the city's citizens. The residents and
potential residents of public housing were, after all, the cousins
and grandparents of members of City Council and the Board. But
these "nice" public housing tenants of the early stages of the
program left the system, and the people who remained did not
engender the sympathy and commitment from the city's leaders that
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their forbears had. Public housing became an eyesore rather than
a source of civic pride. Urban renewal overtook public housing in
the city's consciousness as a cure for slums. As public commitment
to the program decreased, the appointments to the Board were based
not on ability or dedication, but solely on patronage. The Board
grew unable to guide the operations of the agency, except as a
means to secure favors for "their" poor.
By the late sixties, with a conservative ethnic Board well
entrenched, the ineptitude of the CHA became apparent. Opposition
to the procedures of the Authority mushroomed. Community groups,
liberal politicians, the press, and supervising agencies were
mounting serious objections to the manner in which the CHA was
operating. Conditions were ripe for reform of the CHA.
In 1974, a series of events led to the appointment of three
new liberal Commissioners (two by City Council and one by the
Governor) who were committed both to the reform of the Housing
Authority and to the public housing program. In early 1975, Lewis
H. Spence, who had established a reputation as a fair, intelligent,
and energetic reformer, became Executive Director of the CHA. He
was able to replace staff members in key positions and began the
process of sorely needed reform.
The new bureaucrats and Commissioners broke the pattern of
lack of commitment to the public housing program and replaced it
with enthusiasm for change. The patronage in contracts, tenant
selection, hiring, and maintenance was replaced by reformers' rules
and affirmative action. The CHA girded itself against outside
influence. The liberals had gained control, but their task was
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enormous. Developments were in a state of disarray; the CHA was
not in compliance with the 1964 Civil Rights Act; hundreds of
apartments were vacant or vandalized; maintenance work was not
done efficiently; management and fiscal procedures were not
operating successfully. Many years of mismanagement had resulted
in a system which functioned only minimally, and only then for
"friends" of the Board, staff, or City Council.
Public Housing in Cambridge
The Cambridge Housing Authority operates nine low-rent family
housing projects, six elderly projects, and 707 units of leased
housing in privately owned and managed buildings. It has 5,545
family tenants and 1,031 elderly tenants in developments and
approximately 1,800 tenants in leased units. Five of the family
public housing developments were financed by the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts through its Chapter 200 moderate-rent Veterans'
Housing program established in 1948. The first public housing
project in Cambridge, NewTowne Court, was built by the Public
Works Agency and completed in 1938. Three federal projects were
built under the Housing Act of 1937, as amended: Washington Elms
(1942), originally conceived as an extension to NewTowne Court,
John Corcoran Park (1953), and General Putnam Gardens (1954).
Only two developments in the system were built before World
War II. A major construction program began in 1948 for veterans'
housing financed by the state. Nearly 700 apartments were
constructed. The infusion of additional funds and expanded purpose
of the federal Housing Act of 1949 led to the addition of almost
300 units to the public housing stock in Cambridge. The Depression
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and the War had left Cambridge with an old and deteriorating housing
stock. A study made by the Works Progress Administration in 1943
had claimed that 12,722 of the 14,715 low-income residential ~
dwelling units in the city were substandard.2 Much of the housing
in Cambridge had been built in the early 1900s as the industriali-
zation of the city was expanding. It was clear after World War II
that a major building program was necessary to decently house the
families of Cambridge. Certainly the low-income families of the
city had the fewest options. According to the CHA, "...Young
marrieds just getting a start in life are forced to live apart or
crowded in with in-laws; others are living in basement apartments
without adequate facilities for decent living; or in furnished
rooms never meant for family use. There are also the fathers and
mothers of four, five, six, or more children who are so unpopular
as tenants everywhere in this disturbed world..." 3
The accelerated development program added 987 low and moderate
rent housing units between 1948 and 1954. These public developments
were not typical of the large city high-rises that were commonly
built after World War II. Except for two elevator buildings in
state projects, all the developments built during this period were
garden apartment style. Jefferson Park (309 units) and Roosevelt
Towers (228), the two large state-aided developments with elevator
buildings, were constructed close to or on the sites of temporary
war housing. Jefferson Park, bordered by railroad tracks, a
cemetary, and a dump, was locaLed on the outskirts of the city,
inconvenient to transportation and shopping. Roosevelt Towers
was built in East Cambridge, one of the city's poorest ethnic
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neighborhoods. Woodrow Wilson Court (69 units), Lincoln Way (60
units) and Jackson Gardens (46 units) were small state developments
which largely blended into their neighborhoods' surroundings. The
state projects were intended for moderate-income veterans; their
shallower subsidy required more expensive rents than the federal
developments. This distinction was in existence until the state
passed its own versions of the Brooke Amendment in 1970 and 1971,
which adjusted rents to tenants' incomes. In 1950, state-aided
rents ranged from $37.00 for a one-bedroom apartment to $65.00 for
a four-bedroom apartment whie in federal developments the rents
ranged from $18.00 for a one-bedroom to $55.00 for a four-bedroom,
depending upon the ability to pay. Rents for both kinds of
developments were set at no less than 20% of the family's income.
The two federal projects built during this period were both
small and low-rise. Putnam Gardens (123 units), built on cleared
slum land, and Corcoran Park (152 units), constructed on what had
been a marsh and pond, were both less than half the size of the
previous federal developments. Neither development was built on
an urban renewal site. Washington Elms (324 units) and NewTowne
Court (294 units) are adjacent to each other. By the early 1950s,
the concentration of social problems in the Washington Elms-
NewTowne Court area was troublesome to the rest of the city. A
committee of concerned social service agencies cited immorality,
drinking, broken homes, delinquency, and gambling in the federal
projects as a consequence of the size of the projects as well as
other social factors.4 This sentiment kept new federal housing
small in size. Perhaps since the state projects were intended for
70
higher-income tenants, the size of those projects was
not as volatile a local issue as the federal projects. The
availability of the land where temporary war housing had been
located also made land assembly easier for state projects.
During the period of development following the War, the
relationship of the Housing Authority with the rest of the city
bureaucracy was cooperative. The City Planning Department provided
technical assistance to the CHA in site selection. The Housing
Authority, by the same token, sought to carry out redevelopment
"in accordance with the City Plan." 5 The City Council did not,
according to one member, interfere with site selection.6 The
sites chosen during this time were dispersed throughout the city.
The sites, however, with the possible exception of Corcoran Park,
did not violate the status quo of Cambridge. Public housing is
notably absent from the wealthy sections of the city. Areas
surrounding Harvard and MIT were not chosen as public housing sites.
The universities owned much of their adjacent property and while
during the early fifties they were small institutions compared to
their present size, they constituted a substantial part of the
"establishment" in Cambridge. Prior to the construction of Putnam
Gardens, almost all of Cambridge's public housing was occupied by
white families, and constructed in white neighborhoods.
By the mid-fifties, the City Council effectively vetoed the
construction of any new public housing. Construction halted until
1963, when the John F. Kennedy Apartments for the elderly were
built. Five federal elderly projects were to follow. The first
state elderly project is scheduled to open in summer of 1976.
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The City and Its Needs
Cambridge of 1976 is significantly different from the Cambridge
of 1950. The city has rapidly changed from a Yankee industrial
town whose factories were manned by Irish, Canadian, and Italian
immigrants to a city of wealthy professionals, students, young
people, and the poor. Household composition has changed drastically.
Fewer and fewer of Cambridge's residents are living in families.
Social and racial conditions are very different than they had been
when the public housing program began. Like many old cities,
young families have increasingly moved to the suburbs for the
amenities which Cambridge could not provide as easily. These
demographic shifts have influenced the role which public housing
plays in the city.
The population of Cambridge, according to the 1950 Census,
totalled 120,740 persons, 5,672 of whom were non-white.7 4,862
(14.8%) of its 33,437 dwelling units were, according to the Census,
without private bath or dilapidated. A majority of Cambridge
residents (76.6%) occupied rental units. Their average contract
rent in 1950 was $42.75 per month. The median city income was
$2,457.
By 1960, the population of Cambridge had dropped to 107,716.8
The non-white population was 6,787 (6.3%). Its housing stock
increased by 1,893 units (5%). The extent of private residential
building was small. A net increase of only 940 rental units was
realized from 1950-1960, a fact which indicates the importance of
the public housing building program, for 918 public units were
added during this period. The proportion of renters remained
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roughly the same as in 1950 (77.5%). The increase in substandard
units from 4,862 in 1950 to 5,210 in 1960 may reflect the changing
definition of standard housing, but also the continuing deteriora-
tion of some of the housing stock despite clearance of whole
neighborhoods for urban renewal. The average contract rent had
risen by 1960 to $70 per month.
The decade of the sixties witnessed many changes in Cambridge.
Manufacturing industries accelerated their relocation from the
city and factory jobs became more scarce. Coupled with the removal
of industrial facilities was the expansion of the universities in
Cambridge. Harvard and MIT's enrollment soared, and students who
had been both small in-numbers and generally confined to on-campus
housing began to demand the city's housing resources. Students
shared houses and could pay more as a group than most families.
The population declined 6.8% further by 1970 (100,361). The black
population was stable (6,783; 6.8%), and Cambridge was beginning
to develop a Hispanic population (1,970; 1.9%).9
The 1970 Census showed the average contract rent up to $130
per month. This household rent represents an increase of 90% over
1960, triple the median increase for the Boston metropolitan area
and four times that of the Consumer Price Index for all U.S. cities.
1 0
Not only did apartment rents rise dramatically by 1970, but the
conditions of apartments did not greatly improve. The U.S. Census
of 1970 did not report the extent of deterioration of housing units
but it did indicate that 18% of the 32,000 privately owned units
lacked -central heat and over 5% were deficient in plumbing
facilities. 11 A survey conducted in 1972 by the city indicated
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that the external condition of 4,300 structures (44%) required
minor repair; another 1,200 structures required major repair.12
Median family income in Cambridge increased from $5,923 in
1960 to $9,815 in 1970. 1,805 families were below the poverty
level. In 1950, 100,000 people lived in families while by 1970,
only 66,000 persons did so. The 1975 mid-decade census showed that
only about half of the 102,096 persons in Cambridge lived in
families.13 The remainder were people living alone or in non-
family groups. The decrease in family population and the lack of
family housing resources are intertwined. Large houses have been
converted into smaller units which can rent for more money. New
housing construction has been almost exclusively small apartments
at high rentals. Even new publicly assisted housing has not been
for families. Of 3,000 units added to the city's stock between
1970 and 1975, only 900 have been for moderate-income families,
300 for low-income families. Less than 100 of the apartments have
had more than three bedrooms.1 4
Rent control, adopted in 1970, has helped slow the dramatic
increase in housing costs in Cambridge, but families have a
continuing problem. Rents have gone up and the supply of adequately
sized housing for families has decreased. The older family-size
homes continue to deteriorate. Families of low income are hard-
pressed to find suitable homes.
7,769 families (as well as 27,886 unrelated individuals) had
incomes under $8,000 in 1970. With only approximately 3,000 units
of public housing, many eligible families were not served in the
public market and therefore paid a disproportionate amount of their
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income for housing or lived in poor housing conditions, or both.
The waiting list for public housing in Cambridge has been
substantial since the inception of the program. Despite the
continuing deterioration of the public housing stock, the demand
for public housing in Cambridge remains strong. In 1950, 1,561
applications were on the waiting list. In 1964, the list totalled
1,478 families. In April, 1975, 1,583. With turnover in CHA
projects averaging only 200 apartments per year, it would take
seven years to house everyone on the waiting list.
As in other cities, minority families in Cambridge have been
further pressed by the lack of housing opportunities than whites.
Previously, the Cambridg-e Housing Authority had not been- as large
a resource to the black community as its need required. In 1957,
only 138 families (8%) in the Authority's 1,605 units were black.
By 1975, 23% of the public housing population in Cambridge was
black, 4% Spanish-speaking. The waiting list for family develop-
ments in 1975 was 29% black and 12% Hispanic. 1970 Census data
indicates that of all families with yearly incomes less than $8,000,
9.4% were black and 4% Hispanic. Clearly the proportion of black
and Hispanic CHA applicants is larger than the proportion of income-
eligible black and Spanish-speaking families in the entire
population. Moreover, newer applicants are increasingly minority
families.
The widespread desertion of public housing by its white
population has not occurred in Cambridge, as it has in many cities.
Some developments (e.g., Washington Elms) have difficulty in
getting white applicants to accept housing, but none of Cambridge's
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projects are all minority. In a city with a small minority
population and no all-black neighborhoods, such as Cambridge, an
increasingly minority-occupied public housing program has great
implications. Other cities have demonstrated that as public
housing developments become increasingly black, whites not only
leave the developments, but also come to see the program as a
black housing program. Options decrease for low-income white
families to obtain standard housing within their means.
As stated previously, the city and the Board's commitment to
the public housing program diminished as the housing deteriorated
and the population shifted. An all-minority public housing
program has further implications for the political status quo in
Cambridge. Fully 8% of the city's population lives in public
housing. If the composition of the City Council continues to be
split between ethnics and liberals, and the ethnic constituents
no longer are interested in securing public housing units, the
influence of City Hall conservatives may decrease. If the liberals
maintain their interest in public housing as a social program and
continue to operate according to the rules, the commitment and
political will necessary to run the program for all its tenants
will continue. The "coziness" which characterized the ethnic
politicians' relationship to both their constituents and the Housing
Authority, will be replaced again by impersonal "civic pride."
The pendulum of Cambridge politics has swung toward the liberals
who had originally operated the program. The change in the
composition of Cambridge's population and particularly the change
in the population of public housing, from white ethnics to a more
racially integrated mix of families, has aided that swing.
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CHAPTER IV
OFFICIAL PAPER: CAMBRIDGE'S WRITTEN TENANT SELECTION PLANS
During the 39-year period of its life, the Cambridge Housing
Authority has published a number of written tenant selection plans.
In general, the plans have reflected the federal regulations of
the period. In fact, Cambridge implemented many of the procedures
which were only suggested by the federal government during the
period (1952-1967) when federal intervention was minimal. In the
late sixties, however, Cambridge Housing Authority diverged from
a responsive path to resist the imposition of stricter federal
rules. This chapter discusses the evolution of Cambridge's
official policy from 1950 to 1975.
Since the plans were substantially updated only four times
during the period of 1950 to 1975, changes in federal statues and
regulations were often not refelcted in CHA written policy until
long after they had been proclaimed in Washington. A change in
eligibility requirements, such as the eligibility of single elderly
persons in 1956, was carried out in practice, but was not
incorporated into a written plan until 1963. This lag is not
surprising, for in the past, tenant selection plans in Cambridge
have been documents merely for the record. Because the internal
document did not carry much weight in practice, its revision was
not of high priority. The federal and -state government did not
demand much oversight power until the 1-2-3 rule was adopted in
1967. Indeed, the federal government encouraged Local Housing
Agencies to develop their own procedures. Applicants or tenants
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did not make demands on the local authorities about their adherence
to any formal plan. With few rights to due process guaranteed,
applicants either accepted the decisions of local agencies or, if
aggrieved, tried to get help from a politician.
To the Cambridge Housing Authority, the existence of an
official plan was of little importance. A tenant selection plan
was just another piece of paper which the federal government
demanded, along with numerous other reporting forms, occupancy
audits, and on-site visits. In fact, the federal government did
not exert much pressure on Cambridge to -implement its written plans.
The only real requirement was to have it in the files. Neither the
federal agencies nor the state agency which might have overruled
the practices of the local agency did so.
Yet Cambridge did clarify some of its requirements for
admission in its formal plans. For instance, it was written in
1954 that unwed mothers were acceptable only if they were of good
moral and social character.* The written plans generally contained
formal requirements for eligibility that were universally applicable.
But many informal discretionary actions were possible within the
plans; few checks on this discretion were established. For
example, it was the Tenant Selection officer who determine the
boundaries of "good moral and social character." The Board of
Commissioners set policy regarding tenant selection and screening
One might interpret that an unwed mother could be of good moral
character if she had repented. A woman who had more than one
illegitimate child, however, would probably have been denied
housing.
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of applicants, and at the same time pressured the Tenant Selection
officer on behalf of particular applicants, and in so doing
circumvented their own policy.
From 1950-1969, the CHA tenant selection system worked in the
following manner, according to its written plans: An applicant
came to the central office where a secretary would take the
application, which included the prospective tenant's family
composition, address, employment, income, citizenship, marital
status, and veteran's status. The application was then filed.
Later, a home visit was made to the applicant. The time lag
between filing an application and the home visit could be very
long or quite short. Some applicants never received a visit
because CHA never intended to house them. The purpose of the home
visit was to determine living conditions, housing need, and the
social conditions under which the family lived. The applicant was
scored on the urgency of his/her housing need. Tenants were
selected on the basis of their relative housing need and not by
the date of their application. If an applicant was rejected, s/he
was not told, nor given a chance to refute the "charges" to reverse
the decision. When they were chosen, tenants were expected to take
an apartment quickly. Assignment was completely up to the Tenant
Selection officer, who chose where to place each tenant. When a
new project was under construction, applications were taken for it
specifically. Otherwise, applicants stated their preference
regarding where they wanted to live.1
In the absence of stringent federal direction regarding
procedures of tenant selection and assignment, Cambridge Housing
80
Authority developed its own procedures and policy until 1968.
Cambridge operated a system where families of "good character"
were able, in general, to get apartments, and families which did
not meet the CHA's definition of good moral character were rejected.
Furthermore, rejected applicants had no rights to challenge the
CHA's decisions; they were not necessarily even informed of the
decisions.
In 1968, the CHA, under pressure from HUD, changed its system
to a first-come, first-served waiting list. Whereas a waiting list
of sorts had existed previously, it was not orgainzed in any
manner which could be monitored. HUD regulations required a written
list so applicants could monitor their own progress on the lsit.
Since assignment was based upon chronological order under the
regulation, if one applicant applied in 1969, s/he in theory would
be housed before an applicant who filed in 1970, regardless of
either applicant's housing conditions or political influence.
However, CHA retained some priority categories in the new system.
Chapter 121B of the Massachusetts General Laws, the enabling
legislation which governs LHAs in Massachusetts, requires veterans'
preference for state-aided projects and a priority for displacees.
People in emergency conditions were able to jump the rest of the
waiting list. The Tenant Selection officer was able to decide
what constituted an emergency; tenants could not appeal his
decision. Assignment was supposed to be made according to the
number of vacancies in the project, in accordance with the 1-2-3
rule. Every applicant, as s/he reached the top of the chronological
waiting list, was supposed to have been offered the project with
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the most vacancies. If the applicant turned down that development,
s/he should have been placed at the bottom of the list. However,
applicants with strong backing from politicians or social service
workers were exempt from the rules and were offered better develop-
ments. In reality, then, despite the formalization of rules by
the 1-2-3 provisions, the Tenant Selection officer did still
exercise discretion in assignment. In so doing, he extended the
stratified system of public housing. Previously he had rejected
families of bad character; with the tightening of federal rules
to enforce equity, he assigned these bad families to bad developments.
The tightening of federal restrictions in this arena clarified
a federal position on racial patterns and created an atmosphere for
increasing intervention of the federal government in the four
issues of tenant selection discussed in Chapter II. But long
before the federal government clarified national positions on race,
income, priority order, and basis for rejection, the Cambridge
Housing Authority had to devise its own answers to the questions
which Congress had evaded. The issues of race, income, priority
order, and basis for rejection did not cease being controversial
at the local level just because no policy direction came from
Washington. Indeed, the jurisdiction where it has historically
been most politically dangerous to make such redistributive deci-
sions as tenant selection became the only arena where policies
were established. The lack of federal guidance placed an enormous
burden on local agencies. There was no support for LHAs that wanted
to take action on unresolved issues.
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The Cambridge Housing Authority had two choices in writing its
own formal plans. It could either try to clarify its official
position on the four issues, or it could overlook the issues in
its plans. Since the four issues were unavoidable in practice,
however, they would have to be addressed in an informal way if they
were not dealt with formally. The following section is a discussion
of the manner in which the four issues of race, income, priority
order, and basis for rejection were formally addressed in the
Cambridge Housing Authority's tenant selection plans from 1950-1975.
Race
All CHA plans perfunctorily stated that the Authority practiced
non-discrimination on the basis of race, religion, or political
affiliation. In practice, however, that statement meant little.
Cambridge's non-white population was a small percentage of
the city during the 1950s when the CHA development program was in
full swing. In 1950, only 4.7% of the city's population was black.
The black population was concentrated in several areas of the city,
notably Riverside and Cambrid-geport. The area around NewTowne
Court and Washington Elms, two federal housing demelopments built
before World War II, had contained a substantial black population
until the slum clearance of the area had necessitated relocation.
A study done in 1946 stated "the NewTowne Court project has caused
a great deal of feeling in the Negro community as many Negro
families were moved out of the area and now only a few have dwellings
in the project. Some displaced Negro families were forced out of
the district." 2 Before slum clearance, 40% of the families in that
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neighborhood had been black, but only 5% of the project residents
were black, according to the study.
Allotment of apartments on the basis of race was not a part
of any written tenant selection plan, but is evident in the sites
on which Cambridge public housing is located. Only one project,
Putnam Gardens, was built in a racially mixed neighborhood. The
other projects were located in ethnic white communities at the
time of their construction except NewTowne Court, which cleared a
racially mixed neighborhood and replaced it with white residents.
The annual contributions contracts for Cambridge's federal housing
stated that mixed racial occupancy for all Cambridge federally
aided housing was intended. None of the housing projects were
completely segregated. But, except for Putnam Gardens, integration
was token until the late 1960s. Black applicants were assigned to
Putnam Gardens mostly and to Washington Elms. CHA did not violate
the existing racial patterns of neighborhoods. In 1955, the Civic
Unity Committee stated that 80% of the blacks in Cambridge earned
less than $3,000 per year and that the population of low-income
blacks in urban renewal areas was larger still. The report stated
that displaced Negroes encountered a double barrier: the general
shortage of adequate low rental housing and prejudice and
discrimination that made it difficult to compete for limited low
rent housing.3 The relocation of black families who were not
eligible for public housing from the Putnam Gardens site was difficult
because of racial discrimination. All of the 68 families on the
site were black, but for those ineligible, "there [were] very few
accomodations available to colored people. In the neighborhoods
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where they were acceptable, the vacancies never came on the
market."4 Yet the CHA did little to pioneer the placement of
blacks in areas of the city where they did not already live.
By 1960, the percentage of non-whites in Cambridge had
increased to 6.3%; by 1970, minorities constituted 8.7% of
Cambridge's residents. But until enforcement of the equal
opportunity provisions of federal laws and regulations, blacks
constituted a small percentage of Cambridge's public housing
population and were housed in only a few developments. In the
late 1960s, the situation began to change, in part because of the
controversy with the federal government over Equal Opportunity in
Housing.
Controversy over Regulations
The 1-2-3 rule was developed to correct highly politicized
assignment processes which tended, across the country, to
discriminate against some applicants and maintain racially
segregated housing developments. It also was meant to correct
previous federal practices which promoted segregation. The
Cambridge Housing Authority openly fought the implementation of
the 1-2-3 rule. The CHA was not in official compliance with the
rule until 1975, although the rule was promulgated in 1967.
The circular which instated the 1-2-3 rule allowed possible
waiver of the rule if the Local Housing Agency could demonstrate
that during the preceding 12 months, its vacancy rate had been
less than 5%; that at least 2/3 of its projects were desegregated
on more than a token basis; and that a continuation of the
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Authority's existing plan would be likely to result in a greater
degree of occupancy and desegregation than the 1-2-3 rule would
facilitate.
The CHA, in a 1967 letter to HUD which asked for a waiver of
the 1-2-3 rule, stated that "the continuance of our existing
procedure will result in the same good vacancy and desegregation
record which the...figures indicate.. .If the proposed new plan
were to be put into operation, it might tend to discriminate against
non-white applicants, if we were to take our complete application
file and begin selection on the basis of time of receipt..."5 The
CHA developed a compromise plan, stating that all dwelling units
would be assigned on a uniformly nondiscriminatory basis with
respect to race, color, or national origin; the CHA also promised
it would not practice discrimination in maintenance, equipment,
facilities, services, and the treatment of tenants.
The statement of such promises was not new. In response, HIUD
argued that the Cambridge figures did not show substantial
desegregation nor indicate that continuance of the existing plan
would likely result in a greater degree of occupancy and desegre-
gation than 1-2-3. In addition, HUD threatened that failure to
comply might defer new construction, acquisition, modernization,
turnkey, and leasing obligations, as well as amendments for
financial assistance.6
In November, 1968, the CHA Board agreed to adopt a plan which
conformed with 1-2-3 requirements. HUD approved the plan until a
compliance review in July, 1970, indicated the following
deficiencies: (1) racial imbalance at Corcoran Park; (2) segregation
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in the leased housing program; (3) a low rate of participation
of minority landlords in the leasing program, and (4) a low rate
of minority employment at the Housing Authority. A conciliation
agreement was reached in July, 1970, which mandated affirmative
steps to improve the proportion of minority tenants at Corcoran
Park and to increase minority employment and minority landlord
participation in the leasing progrma.
During this period of conciliation, however, the Equal
Opportunity Office in the HUD regional office found that Cambridge
was in noncompliance with its own voluntary compliance agreement.7
Two years later, in 1973, the CHA was still not in compliance. HUD
retaliated. The contract of sale on a turnkey project was delayed
because there were late occupancy reports on all projects, no
minority hires, and the racial patterns in developments indicated
little change from the situation in 1967.
The refusal to enforce the 1-2-3 rule was more than an exten-
sion of previous responses to federal rules. It constituted
outright defiance of HUD. Whereas other rules could be incorporated
into the existing procedures, the 1-2-3 rule required a a complete
overhaul. Waiting lists had to be reorganized, records had to be
kept. More importantly, if the 1-2-3 rule were enforced, the
political favors on which CHA had been nurtured could not be
repaid as easily. If tenant selection were made systematic,
abuses of the system could be spotted easily. Moreover, the 1-2-3
rule was not a perfect tool for integration or administration in
Cambridge. The rule required that assignment be made without
regard to race; such a procedure might as easily stifle integration
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as enhance it. Furthermore, the applicant under the 1-2-3 rule
could not choose where s/he would like to live. Cambridge is a
small city, but nonetheless has strong neighborhoods. A lifelong
East Cambridge resident would not generally choose to live in
North Cambridge and, in fact, might experience hardship if s/he
had to do so, for all his/her social and familial supports would
be elsewhere. The 1-2-3 rule made the false assumption that all
public housing units were the same. It depersonalized tenant
selection to make the Local Housing Authority a "big brother."
For these reasons, the 1-2-3 rule did not necessarily serve the
CHA or its clients. Non-compliance was based both on a disagreement
with the principle of the 1-2-3 rule and on resistance to the
unprecedented involvement of the federal government in the day-to-
day affairs of the CHA.
The Cambridge Housing Authority's active resistance was bound
to backfire. The refusal to comply with HUD on the equal opportunity
provisions of its regulations was to cost the CHA and its Board of
Commissioners dearly. Along with the eventual establishment of
the community-wide waiting list and the 1-2-3 assignment rules.,
the state Department of Community Affairs (DCA) imposed a strict
record-keeping system on CHA in order to audit CHA's tenant selection
procedures. According to HUD, the denial of Section 8 Housing
Assistance payments in 1975 was based upon the history of CHA's
noncompliance with equal housing opportunity.
Even though the CHA is now in compliance, the issue of racial
discrimination has hardly been overcome in Cambridge public housing.
Several racial flare-ups in predominantly white housing projects
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in recent years have caused CHA officials to act cautiously in
housing minority tenants at these projects. While, according to
the 1-2-3 rule, offers of apartments are made in a racially-blind
manner, acceptance rates largely reflect the racial patterns of
developments. Understanding that racially blind assignments may
not always serve the purpose of racial harmony or integraton,
Cambridge Housing Authority has from time to time placed a ceiling
on minority admissions to some projects. The imposition of
occupancy controls constitutes a violation of the 1-2-3 rule, but
in 1975, such controls were placed on Washington Elms under HUD
direction.
The newest CHA applicant selection and assignment plan,
written in 1975, encompasses the 1967 rule. Assignment is not
necessarily to the project with the highest number of vacancies
but to the next available unit. An additional desegregation
provision is included in the 1975 plan: preference is given to
transfer applicants who, if they are black or Hispanic, are willing
to transfer to a project that is 65% or more occupied by white
families; or, if they are white, are willing to transfer to a unit
in a project that is 35% or more occupied by minority families.
For the first time, race has been explicitly mentioned in a plan. 8
Income
Income limits for admission have increased since the program
began, but they have not kept pace with the increase in income in
the city as a whole. The published limits from 1954 to the present
are listed in Table 4.1.
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Table 4.1
Income Limits for Admission and Continued Occupancy
Cambridge Housing Authority 1954-75
Source: Cambridge Housing Authority
No. in Family
2
3,
5,
2
3
5
7
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
4
6
,4
,6
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Net Income
for AdmissionYear
1954
(Continued occupancy limits were eliminated
Community Development Act of 1974.)
For Continued
Occupancy
$ 2,875
3,125
3,500
4,250
4,500
4,875
5,125
5,250
5,250
5,950
6,050
6,400
6,500
6,950
5,700
6,300
6,800
7,100
7,400
7,700
7,900
8,100
8,300
8,500
$2,300
2,500
2,800
3,400
3,600
3,900
4,100
4,400
4,400
4,800
4,900
5,200
5,300
5,700
4,600
5,200
5,700
6,000
6,300
6,600
6,800
7,000
7,200
7,400
5,600
6,300
6,800
7,300
7,700
8,100
8,400
8,700
8,900
9,100
7,275
8,200
8,850
9,500
10,000
10,52E
10,925
11,300
11,575
11,825
by the Housing and
1961
1963
1971
1973-
present
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From 1937 until 1969, rent levels determined income limits.
According to the Housing Act, family income could not exceed five
times the rent (six times if the family had three or more minors).
Rent was determined by the 20% gap formula. For each project, the
CHA surveyed current market rentals and found the price at which
the private market was supplying sufficient standard units. The
public housing rent for the project was set at that private market
rent minus 20%. The CHA estimated the amount of expenditures that
would be needed to operate the project and build reserve funds.
From these measures, a system of graded rents was established, so
each project was to house a cross-section of low-income familes.
Rents dictated the overall cost of the project as well as the
income limits for occupancy.
Income limits for admission and continued occupancy were
updated periodically, as indicated in Table 4.1. To do so, CHA
would survey banks, real estate brokers, the unemployment office,
and other sources of wage rates to ascertain the level of rents
and incomes in the community. New limits were submitted to the
Public Housing Administration of HHFA for their approval. After
1969, the Brooke Amendment required income to determine rent rather
than vice-versa. The last increase, in 1973, was at the suggestion
of HUD. That HUD suggested the most recent increase in income
limits is indicative of the increasing direction which the federal
government is taking with regard to LHA practices. The federal
government is trying to require LHAs to increase their revenues as
well as encourage a mix of incomes at every project. By raising
income limits, it becomes possible for higher-income applicants to
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be eligible. If these higher-income families do apply and become
tenants, they will pay higher rentals than their poorer counterparts,
since rent is a fixed proportion of income, and thus reduce the
federal contribution to operating expenses.
Not only has the level of income been redefined over the years
by local policy, but also the definition of income has changed in
accordance to federal regulations. From 1950 until 1971, CHA plans
computed net income as all family income minus $100 for each minor
dependent. Tenants' incomes and family composition were examined
yearly. If their income exceeded continued occupancy limits, they
were to be evicted. Even though the Housing Act of 1959 repealed
specific federal definitions of rent-income ratios, exemptions and
deductions, the CHA did not change its written policy. Rather, it
continued to abide by the prior federal definition of income. In
1971, the CHA, in accordance with the Housing Act of 1970, redefined
net income in order to calculate rent. Net income, according to
both law, regulations, and CHA plans, consisted of all family
income minus certain deducitons. These deductions were:
-- 5% of income
-- extraordinary medical expenses
-- unusual occupational expenses
-- cost of day care of sick care
-- $300 per minor
-- $300 per secondary wage earner
-- casual income, value of food stamps
-- lump sum payments (e.g., insurance settlement,
inheritance, capital gains)
-- scholarships
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The 1971 CHA plan also allowed special, higher income limits to be
applied to displaced persons and limited assets up to $10,000.
The redefinition of income by the Housing Act of 1970 followed
ten years of local discretion over the definition of income. The
1974 Act placed further restrictions on local policy. It required
LHAs to maintain developments with a mix of families within the
low-income group, thereby recreating a "graded" rent and income
system, which had been abandoned by the CHA previously. Income-
mixing provisions have not yet been incorporated in any CHA plan,
but the establishment of federal policy on this matter is another
indicator of a trend toward increasing federal control. While
the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 requires LHAs
to develop plans for income-mixing, HUD has not issued regulations
which help the LHAs develop such plans. The juggling of the 1-2-3
rule, desegregation, income-mixing, and screening is not a trivial
task for Tenant Selection officers to accomplish. CHA has chosen
not to concentrate energy on income-mixing as yet.
Priority Order
From 1950 until 1968, tenants were selected to live in public
housing in Cambridge according to the severity of their need.
Until 1963, first preference was given to displacees of slum
clearance or redevelopment. Within this category, preference was
given to disabled veterans, then deceased veterans' families, and
then other veterans. After displacees were housed, other veterans
were housed. According to the 1950 plan, non-veterans were
discouraged from applying because enough eligible veterans applied
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to fill all available units. Within each priority category,
according to the plans, those applicants with the most urgent
housing need were housed first.
While the written plans established these priorities, no
monitoring of their precedures occurred. A family which scored
higher on housing need was not guaranteed a unit before a family
with less need. Chronological order of application had no bearing
on assignment. Such a loosely defined system was wide open for
exceptions to the rules, since applicants could not guage their
progress on any waiting list. The plan, however, did comply with
federal regulations. CHA's concurrence with the priority order
developed by Congress left many decisions up to the Tenant Selec-
tion officer.
The 1971 CHA plan stated that applicants were eligible for
emergency public housing. if they were (1) displacees; (2) living
in unsafe, unsanitary, or overcrowded conditions; (3) renting at
more than 25% of income; (4) without housing; or (5) about to be
without housing as a result of a court-ordered eviction. These
priorities were a way to circumvent chronological order imposed
by the 1-2-3 rule. Within these categories, applicants were to
be housed according to the date of their application. However,
veterans retained their priority status as required under state
enabling legislation. The effect of these complicated priority
categories within the 1-2-3 rule was to effectively negate the
usefulness of a chronologically-based waiting list. There were
enough emergencies to fill most available vacancies, especially
those vacancies which occurred in the best developments. The
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chronological list was used to fill vacancies only occasionally,
and usually at the worst developments.
The 1975 plan established three priority categories: (1)
emergencees/displacees; (2) veterans (for family housing only);
(3) all others. Emergency applicants were granted priority under
the new plan only after rigid examination of their claims for
emergency status by a committee of three staff members, and the
approval of the Executive Director. Because the determination of
priority status had previously been the responsibility of the
Tenant Selection officer alone, it had been open to manipulation.
With the establishment of an emergency committee which limits the
granting of emergency status, applicants are granted this status
only when they are in true emergency situations. Veterans no
longer constitute a large proportion of applicants. Hence, the
majority of assignments to apartments are made from the chronological
waiting list. This system is fairer to all applicants and allows
applicants to realistically predict when they will be offered an
apartment.
Basis for Rejection
The 1954 Housing Act removed the requirement that tenants be
U.S. citizens. State law continued to require citizenship until
1976. The official plan of the CHA did not remove citizenship as
a requiremcnt until 1963. In response to the removal of the
requirement from federal law in 1954, however, the CHA adopted a
recommendation that either the husband or wife of a family be .a
U.S. citizen.
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Before 1971, the CHA had a strict residency requirement. From
1949 until 1961, an applicant had to be a resident of Cambridge
for at least one year to be eligible for public housing. From
1961-until 1971, the official plans stated that applicants had to
be three-year residents of Cambridge in order to be eligible. The
Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination wrote a letter to
CHA advising them of the decision of Cole v. the City of Newport
Housing Authority in 1971 which declared residency requirements
unconstitutional. Soon afterward, Cambridge repealed its residency
requirement. For most of the years which the Cambridge Housing
Authority operated its program, however, tenants had to have been
Cambridge residents previous to their tenancy. By creating such
a requirement, CHA severely restricted the extent to which its
housing served the transient poor community.
Previous to 1956, only families, as defined by federal law,
were eligible for public housing; single elderly and displacees
were made eligible later, and these exceptions were included in
the CHA plans.
Cambridge Housing Authority's plans have been explicit about
who was not acceptable for public housing tenancy. The 1954 plan
clarifies the intention of the CHA to reject some applicants as
unsuitable. Applicants could be rejected for the following reasons:
-- if it is determined prior to selection that the members
of the applicant's family are not of good moral and
social character;
-- if an unwed mother has a history of repeated instances
of children born out of wedlock or is otherwise not of
good moral and social character;
-- if the applicant or member of his or her family has a
police or probation record or a history of recent, serious,
or numerous criminal offenses. 9
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The definition of "good moral and social character" was ambiguous
at best, and discriminatory and biased at worst. The Tenant
Selection officer made final decisions regarding suitability. He
was not required to inform rejected applicants of their status,
and probably did not reject many applicants outright.
Irwin Deutscher described the criteria used by one Tenant
Selector in his article, "The Gatekeeper in Public Housing." The
Tenant Selector gave consideration to those applicants who were
desirable. Desirability was based upon family composition (unwed
mothers and even single mothers of legitimate children were not
desirable), demeanor (dress, speech, manners, attitudes, cleanliness,
etc.), and race. 1 0  In the housing authority which Deutscher
examined, however, this set of criteria was unwritten. As a result,
when political pressure was brought to bear on the authority, they
could deny the unwritten policy and point to the Tenant Selector
as the scapegoat.
The written provisions for rejection disappeared from Cambridge
plans in 1963. Because home visits were made until 1969, it is
probable that "suitability" criteria were in effect at least until
then. Certainly the arbitrariness of choosing tenants was in
existence until much later. When the 1968 memo from HUD banned
categorical denial of apartments to certain classes of people and
stressed the need for concrete evidence in rejecting an applicant,
the CHA had two choices.1 1  It could reject applicants only if
they exhibited serious criminal or anti-social behavior likely to
harm the project environment. Or it could cease screening
applicants, thereby allowing into public housing people who were
97
likely to disturb other tenants or to vandalize authority property.
The CHA, under pressure of legal assistance attorneys, chose to
effectively eliminate screening.
The absence of screening led to severe problems in these
developments. The Housing and Community Development Act of 1974,
in response to the increasing social problems in public housing
throughout the nation, stressed the need to develop criteria for
rejecting some applicants. HUD regulations, however, had not
clarified legal non-arbitrary procedures for doing so. The 1975
Cambridge Tenant Selection Plan outlines an elaborate process for
screening applicants and denying admission to those applicants
whose behavior is likely to disturb others.12 The plan stated that
the CHA could reject an applicant if it found that:
(1) the applicant has a record of disturbance of neighbors,
destruction of property, or living or housekeeping habits
at prior residences, which if exhibited while a resident
of public housing would be likely to interfere with
other tenants in such a manner as to materially diminish
their enjoyment of the premises by adversely affecting
their health, safety, security, or welfare, or by
adversely affecting the physical environment of neighbors
or the resident community;
(2) the applicant has a history of criminal activity,
including crimes of physical violence to persons or
property, or use, possession, or sale of narcotic drugs;
(3) the applicant has a current history of non-payment of
rent.
A few safeguards exist which may prevent the categories of rejection
from being abused. First, all rejected applicants must be ir.formed
of the reasons for their rejection. Second, applicants have the
right to a hearing to discuss the rejection. Both provisions are
now required by law.1 3 The CHA plan created an elaborate hearing
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procedure which went far beyond the administrative hearing required
by law.
The elaboration of federal definition of rejection criteria
is yet another example of increasing federal control. While local
authorities still have the right to define categories of rejection,
the federal government, in response to court decisions, has
augmented its power in this area.
Summary
It can be seen that the written policy of the Cambridge Housing
Authority from 1950 to 1968 was a reiteration of federal regulations.
No large gaps existed between federal rules and local rules. In
1968, the imposition of the 1-2-.3 rule precipitated a period of
resistance by the CHA to the federal rules. The 1975 Applicant
Selection and Transfer Plan goes beyond many requirements of the
federal government to establish a set of procedures which help
guarantee equity. Increased federal oversight of tenant selection
procedures has warranted this change.
But the written plans of the CHA have not always been the means
by which applicants were selected for apartments. The following
chapter demonstrates the pressures at the local level which had
great implications for the functioning of any tenant selection
system, and further illustrates the gap between the rules and
outcomes.
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CHAPTER V
THE INFORMAL SYSTEM
While the written policy of the Cambridge Housing Authority
generally complied with the federal government requirements, that
policy has not always been followed. Instead, the political
environment within which the CHA operated interfered with the
bureaucratic processes outlined in CHA's plans. Whether the rules
were clearly stated or not, without a concerted effort by the CHA
to eschew political influence, politicians and later social service
agencies often influenced who would get apartments. This chapter
will discuss the reasons for the political intervention, the
personal pressure on the Tenant Selection officer who had to make
the actual decisions regarding who would get an apartment and
where, and the means which the 1975 Applicant Selection and Transfer
Plan devised to depoliticize and depersonalize the tenant selection
process.
From a national political perspective it is significant that
the Local Housing Agencies have been subject to the same political
pressures as any line city agency. The fact that political
influence was wielded by local politicians to obtain concessions
from housing authorities is hardly surprising. The city politicians
and housing authorities were, after all, mutually dependent. In
order to build, the public housing agency had to obtain a waiver
of property taxes for the subsidized housing, get zoning variances,
close city streets, use eminent domain to condemn property, and
use city money for a share of project costs. In some cities,
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referenda were required to build a new project; the political
machinery of the city could either help or hinder the construction
and site selection process. After the projects were built, the
city has had to provide sanitation, fire, and police services as
well as schools for its public housing residents.
The city in turn has been dependent upon public housing if its
leadership was interested in finding a solution for the poor health
and housing conditions of some of its citizens and, after the
Housing Act of 1949, clearing deteriorated slum areas. Because
of the absence of construction during the Depression and the War
years, the construction of federally-funded new housing was in
many cities a political necessity.
Some of the city's citizens were able to reap further benefit
from the program. The owners of condemned property were able to
sell their land and houses at prices which, due to the deterioration
surrounding their property, the parcel would not have drawn on the
private market. The construction program required labor, materials,
and contractors. The maintenance of buildings and grounds and the
management of public housing required both a blue- and white-collar
staff. Finally, the buildings needed occupants. Through the
distribution of contracts, jobs, money, or apartments, the city
politicians realized another gain from the program. In summary,
not only were homes built for low-income residents, but a good
deal of political capital for continuing political interference
in the operations of the Housing Authority.
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Influence in Cambridge
Cambridge city politicians, like politicians elsewhere in the
country, have been actors in the decision-making processes of the
Cambridge Housing Authority. While the CHA was organized as an
independent agency, the CHA Board was actually directly linked to
the political drama of Cambridge. Designed as a "good government"
structure, the organization is run by an independent Board of
Commissioners. It is therefore supposed to be able to make less
politically-biased decisions than an agency directly supervised by
a political office-holder. The CHA Board is appointed for five-
year staggered terms and can only be removed for substantial cause
and after the opportunity for a hearing by the city. In theory,
by creating the independent board structure, the Housing Authority's
isolation from politics should have been assured. But because of
the dependence upon the city for clearances, services, political
clout, and confirmation of Board members, it has been nearly
impossible for the CHA to be truly independent. In addition, it
can be said that the CHA and the city politicians had the same
interests; they were of one mind regarding the function of public
housing.
The selection of tenants for developments has been only one
area of City Hall's use of influence over the CHA throughout its
history. Interference in tenant selection was a logical outgrowth
of the personalized style of politics which has dominated in
Cambridge. While the introduction of Plan E government officially
eliminated ward politics in 1942, many politicians in Cambridge
still functioned in a manner reminiscent of the political machine.
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When a voter needed help finding a public housing unit, it was
commonplace for him/her to seek the help of a politician, primarily
a City Councillor. The politician would use his influence on the
Board or on the Tenant Selection officer to find an apartment for
his client. The politician would thus gain the confidence and
votes of that client and, hopefully, his relatives, friends, and
neighbors. Since the entire City Council is re-elected every two
years, councillors are dependent upon visible and consistent favors
to gain the votes of their constituents.
City politicians as a rule did not intervene through the proper
bureaucratic channels of the CHA; rather they responded to the
pressures of their own office. The families that sought help from
politicians were not necessarily those with the most desperate
housing need or those with the least ability to find an apartment
on the private market. They would not necessarily have come first
in a process which assigned apartments on the basis of veterans'
priority, housing need, or chronological order. Yet the operation
of the CHA's "system" did not concern local politicians. Indeed,
as described in Chapter IV, until 1969, the formal explanation of
the system did not outline an exact order in which applicants were
to be housed or where they would be placed. Manipulation of such
a non-system was simple. Because supervising agencies did not
regulate the practices of local housing authorities, no overseer
challenged the intervention by politicians on behalf of constituents.
Because applicants had no established rights until the mid-sixties,
and because public housing was considered a "privilege" not subject
to the rights of due process, applicants did not challenge these
procedures.
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In essence, one had to "know someone" to get into Cambridge
public housing in the forties, fifties, and sixties. Both Housing
Authority employees and politicians stressed in interviews iith
the author that political influence was not used to stretch the
definition of eligibility; most of the applicants with advocates
were eligible in terms of their incomes, residency, and citizenship.
As the program became the repository of the very poor, only needy
families chose to apply. But once the formal eligibility require-
ments were met, the amount of personal attention and pressure
politicians exerted upon the Housing Authority influenced how
quickly and where an applicant was placed.
Once the sponsored tenant was in an apartment, s/he was able
to call on his/her political sponsor for further help. For example,
a tenant was unruly and threatened with eviction, the manager might
get a call from a politician to halt the eviction process. A
politician might call the manager to demand special maintenance
services for his client. As managers were often dependent upon
City Hall influence for their own and their families' jobs, they
were susceptible to the pressure of a Councillor's requests. If
they did continue with an eviction, there was no guarantee that
the Central CHA Office would back them up in their action.
The sponsoring of applicants had several effects. One was
that no formal system was adhered to, except in the filing of forms
and proper verifications. Therefore the rights of applicants who
did not have access to their "own" City Councillor or who chose
not to apply political pressure were discriminated against. The
second effect was that individual Councillors generally chose to
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sponsor their "friends." Sponsorship was largely on the basis of
ethnic and neighborhood considerations. Cambridge politics have
historically operated according to "blood" rather than procedure.1
If an applicant was not of a favored ethnic or racial group, his/
her chances of obtaining sponsorship decreased.2 Therefore the
intervention of politicians led to the ethnic and racial homogeneity
which characterized Cambridge's housing projects until the late
sixties. The third effect was that it was difficult, if not
impossible, to refuse to house a sponsored applicant. Tne selection
process was thus obstructed by political pressures, as tenants who
might not have fit the CHA's definition of "good" were allowed to
move into public housing because of their sponsor's influence. It
is not clear that sponsored families as a group were any better or
worse tenants than unsponsored families. One might guess that, on
the one hand, politicians would not sponsor families who did not
offer the potential of political (or monetary) support, thereby
eliminating families who were completely outside the social network
of the community. On the other hand, a politician might lend his
support to a family more because another relative was a campaign
worker, than because he knew or needed the support of that particu-
lar applicant. Because it was clear which tenant was sponsored by
which politician, the politician, in some ways, was personally
responsible for the actions of "his" tenants. This acceptance of
responsibility helped keep politically-sponsored tenants "good."
The fourth effect was that, as the community learned that the
endless "list" at the Housing Authority had no meaning, hostility
toward the CHA grew. This culminated in numerous suits claiming
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racial discrimination, City Council hearings on tenant selection
practices, and general community antipathy toward the CHA. But
for the CHA, it was much easier to "play along" with the politicians.
They got no rewards for being just. On the contrary, it was
advantageous to be friendly with City Hall.
When the public housing program was new, expanding, and
popular, local politicians played an even greater role in tenant
selection than later. For new developments, the mayor and
councillors submitted lists of potential tenants to the Housing
Authority. National and state politicians played a major role
during this initial rent up period. Just as the City of Cambridge
and the Housing Authority were mutually dependent, the federal and
state representatives who expedited applications for developments,
lobbied for Cambridge's inclusion in special programs, and
represented Cambridge in business with the government, also exerted
some pressure on the CHA to house favored tenants. The current
Mayor of Cambridge claimed that until recently "everybody had a
finger in choosing tenants -- from the President and U.S. Senators
to local politicians."3 But, as the reputation of the public
housing deteriorated and the tenant composition began shifting from
white to black in some developments, the nature of intervention on
behalf of applicants also changed. Families with political connec-
tions used them to get apartments in only the best developments.
Elderly long-term residents of Cambridge sought help to get
apartments in housing for the elderly. As the applicant pool
changed such that families who chose to live in public housing
drifted- further and further from the political mainstream, they
107
gained access to the Tenant Selection officer by means of a social
service agency rather than a politician. The welfare department,
legal service agencies, and other groups supporting the city's
disenfranchised, exerted strong pressure on the mechanism for
tenant selection.
The CHA was not very dependent upon social workers for important
services and support, as it was on City Hall. Moreover, social
service workers and CHA were not of one mind regarding who should
be housed in public housing; social workers generally had a
different world-view than city politicians and the CHA. However,
the social welfare workers exerted continuous pressure on the
tenant selection mechanism to gain influence. They were persistent
and antagonistic; they forced the CHA to respond to their clients'
needs.
Social workers, unlike politicians, did not take personal
responsibility for their clients' behavior once housed. Because
social workers tend to have clients with problems, they were more
likely to advocate for "bad" applicants. In addition, their
advocacy was, by definition, one-sided.
The same inequities that political sponsorship encouraged
were also present in the welfare agencies' sponsorship of certain
applicants over others. While the criteria for granting sponsorship
were undoubtedly different for the welfare agencies than for the
politicians, the principle remained the same. As long as no
structured system for choosing tenants was followed, not all
applicants were treated equitably. Applicants with advocates were
more difficult to reject. If the number of available apartments
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did not equal or exceed the number of sponsored applicants, only
those with advocates were sure to secure apartments. Some
unsponsored applicants would get the remaining apartments. Other
applications sat in the files. Until the 1-2-3 rule was established
in the late sixties, applicants did not know how long they would
wait on the list. As long as some applicants were jumped ahead of
others, some might wait forever. Some applicants waited twelve
years to be called for an apartment. The Tenant Selector had
complete discretion over where an accepted applicant would be
offered a unit, unless, of course, the advocate pressured him to
place his client in a particular development.
The choice of where to place an applicant was not trivial.
As soon as they were built, some developments were more popular
than others. Some had fewer problems with rowdy children, exhibited
better maintenance, were smaller and more homogeneous, or better
designed. If the Tenant Selector was forced to accept a family
as a tenant, but found that the family was not "clean," or had a
"bad attitude," he would not assign them to the best developments.
The dilemma was obvious. Should a dirty housekeeper be assigned
to a well-kept development, where s/he would bring the family's
roaches and rodents with her, but might be "reformed" by his/her
cleaner neighbors? Or should s/he be "dumped" into a project
where standards for cleanliness were lower, thereby dooming it to
deteriorate further? The Tenant Selector, according to one housing
manager, usually chose the latter route. 4
When the 1-2-3 rule was adopted and strict record-keeping was
imposed by the Department of Community Affairs, applicants were
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able to watch their progress on the list, but the advocates and
their clients took advantage of the availability of a category of
admissions which superseded chronological order (emergency status)
to get apartments quickly. The advocates would show that their
client was in urgent need of public housing in order to qualify
for emergency status. However, standards for determining whether
an applicant was truly an emergency did not exist. The 1-2-3
rule did not eliminate discretion altogether. Rather, the rule
shifted the focus of discretion to a special category of applicants.
The Tenant Selection Officer
All of the pressure from politicians, social service agencies,
and the Board has been focused at one point: the Tenant Selection
officer, who chooses and places applicants in apartments. This
staff member has been dependent upon the Board, his superiors on
the staff, and his political connections for his job. Cambridge
has had one Tenant Selection officer for the past 25 years. His
original political sponsors are no longer in power. His white
collar job is now unionized; in fact, the entire CHA staff union-
ized in 1970 in an effort to secure their jobs, which were
threatened by interference by the Board in day-to-day operations
of the Authority. Unionization did help to minimize some pressures
from the Board, but did not eliminate them.
No matter what pressures the Tenant Selection officer responds
to, he says "no" to applicants more often than "yes." Even if a
system is devised which eliminates most avenues for discretion on
the part of the Tenant Selection officer, the bureaucrat would be
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in the position of villain in the eyes of applicants, for it is
he, the street-level bureaucrat, who sees and speaks to applicants
every day. Because apartment turnover is low, he can actually
offer apartments to only a few of the hundreds of applicants who
apply each year. Depending upon the pressures which are brought
to bear upon him from politicians, the Board, social agencies, or
his superiors on the staff, he is able to house some applicants
before others. If the agencies which oversee his work require
strict adherence to rules, he must be able to justify his choices
according to those rules. If no regulating power exists, he need
not justify the choice to anyone except, perhaps, the people who
are applying pressure on him. The applicants who are not chosen,
however, do not generally disappear. Some of the more docile
applicants will resign themselves to waiting patiently. Some wear
the Tenant Selector out by their persistence. Some try to make
their case stronger and enlist advocates. The more aggressive or
knowledgeable applicants get apartments; those applicants most
easily intimidated do not.
Regardless of the system under which the Tenant Selector
operates, as long as the number of applicants exceeds the number
of vacancies, he must choose among applicants. He has only a
limited number of apartments to distribute to people of similar
need. The rules can help him make the choice of applicants.
Similarly, if no rules exist, he can either impose his own criteria
for choice (e.g., the "best" families), or succumb to the people
who apply the most pressure. By adhering to rules, he becomes
what Deutscher labels a "ritualistic gatekeeper." By encouraging
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subversion of the rules to facilitate achievement of the organiza-
tion's goals (e.g., housing good families), he is a
"debureaucratizing gatekeeper."5 If one of the organizational
foals of the Housing Authority is to maintain an amicable relationship
with City Hall and social service agencies, then housing those
families with backing from these sources is also facilitated by
debureaucratizing.
Choosing a few from a great many applicants can involve
difficult personal choices as well. I would posit that the Tenant
Selector has four alternatives in making and defending those choices.
Depending upon the nature and enforcement of the official rules,
the Tenant Selector can choose to deal with applicants in the
folowing ways:
1. He can say no. If it is clear that an applicant will
not get an apartment because s/he is ineligible or does not appear
suitable, the Tenant Selector can say no directly. If an applicant
is requesting special status, such as emergency status or special
consideration for a transfer, saying no means that the applicant
has to wait with everyone else. If the waiting list is so long
that there is no likelihood that an applicant applying today would
receive an apartment within the next five years, saying no to
special consideration means that the applicant must wait that long.
If the applicant has an advocate, saying no means antagonizing
both the client and his/her sponsor. Saying no is perhaps the
most personally difficult avenue to pursue, for it thwarts hope
(even if it is false hope) in the, minds of applicants and engenders
hostility against the Tenant Selector. For all practical purposes,
112
the Tenant Selection officer did not say no very often unless he
could also refer to rules. Instead, he placed files of rejected
applicants at the back of the file and put off answering.
2. He can say yes. By deciding in favor of a large number
of applicants, he does not have to say no as often, and therefore
takes some personal pressure off himself. For example, he can
stretch the requirements for emergency status to the point that
anyone who claims to be an emergency case or who has an advocate
is placed on a special emergency list. He thus does not have to
say no to as many people who desire special status. However, by
stretching the definition, the meaning of "emergency" is altered.
As the emergency list grows to accomodate the numbers of people
who are loosely defined as emergencies, the likelihood of any
particular emergency case receiving an immediate apartment
diminishes. As a result, while applicants may be calmed by the
fact that they are considered an emergency by the Housing Authority,
they may continue to wait under this system. By saying yes to all
applicants regardless of whether or not those applicants exhibited
patterns of behavior which could be dangerous to the communities
in which they would be housed, it does a disservice to existing
tenants, but it allows the Tenant Selector to avoid making the
judgmental decisions necessary in determining the suitability of
applicants. Because applicants have become better informed of
their rights since the late sixties, the rejection of an applicant
could result in a court battle. Saying yes causes fewer problems
for the Tenant Selector, even if saying yes does make the develop-
ment in which unsuitable applicants are housed more difficult to
113
manage. By saying yes to all applicants, an additional problem
ensues: the waiting list grows to the point that it takes years
to make offers to all the families on the list. By the time
applicants' names are reached, their applications are years old,
they have moved, divorced, remarried, have more or fewer children,
etc. Moreover, if they cannot be reached at all, the apartment
which they have been offered may sit vacant a few more days until
the next applicant can be reached, thereby increasing the chance
of vandalism.
3. He can delay answering. By postponing a decision, the
Tenant Selection officer can take the immediate "heat" off himself.
(For example, he can put off a decision regarding emergency status
until the applicant finds other housing.) Although this tactic
is helpful in the short run, the Tenant Selector must eventually
say yes or no to an applicant or advocate. Delaying might
frustrate an occasional applicant, however, and thereby eliminate
the pressure to make a decision about that particular case.
4. He can defer to the rules. Obedience to the rules takes
the personal burden off the Tenant Selector and places it on
Washington, the State House, or the Board. When the rules them-
selves are restrictive with regard to eligibility, some potential
applicants are discouraged from applying in the first place. For
example, until 1971 the Tenant Selector did not have to consider
any applicant who was not a resident of Cambridge. He could thus
limit the volume of applicants by this simple requirement. By the
same token, he can now deny many non-family applicants the right
to apply for federal public housing. The limit of rule-following,
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however, is that rules can be selectively enforced. A family with
political influence does not always have to play by the rules.
Rules can be recited religiously to "bad" families and forgotten
for "good" ones.
The depersonalization facilitated by abiding by the rules
makes the job of saying no less difficult. The rejected applicant,
if s/he believes that s/he has been treated by the same set of
rules which apply to everyone, can feel s/he has been treated
fairly. If his/her neighbor is housed right away, however, s/he
will be less likely to accept his/her fate. Nonetheless, rules
cannot completely eliminate discretion. Rules never cover every
contingency, and there is good reason to build in some discretion
for the Tenant Selector, in order that he can weigh the needs of
the developments and the city when he makes his decisions. But
rules which are enforced do tend to make the process of choosing
tenants less open to manipulation on a large scale. Rules tend
to create a more informed public able to apply pressure when rules
are broken. The bureaucrat can justify an unpopular decision in
terms of a higher authority, but "power is not diminished by its
being attributed to someone else...thus it is possible to have the
reality of the power without the penalities." 6 When the rules are
not clear, the converse of this statement is true. In that case,
the street-level bureaucrat has the penalties without the power.
When procedures are not delineated by the federal government
or the local agency, the Tenant Selector must define them. When
the rules are vague or not enforced, the decisions he makes are
more difficult. He is not backed by the strict rules which make
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individual decisions part of a systematic procedure. If he cannot
often justify his decisions on the basis of the rules, he must
either say yes, say no, or delay. Each of these decisions is more
personally demanding than deference to the rules. When lack of
rules is accompanied by political pressure, the Tenant Selector,
who has political backing only insofar as he pleases his superiors,
who are in turn dependent upon political influence, naturally
succumbs to those exerting the most pressure.
The Tenant Selection officer in Cambridge has operated in all
four modes. Some applicants received different treatment than
others. The rules that did exist were often enforced selectively;
definitions were enlarged to encompass the applicants who had
strong backing or who exerted the most pressure on the Tenant
Selection officer themselves. The response of the Tenant Selection
officer has been dependent upon the rules that existed and the
tendency of the Board and staff to enforce those rules.
From 1950 to 1969, the tenant selection rules in Cambridge
were not well-defined. Housing need, displacement, and veteran's
preference were ostensibly the only criteria for the selection of
applicants. But the actual order and speed with which selected
applicants were to be housed was not circumscribed, and was open
to manipulation. During this period, the Tenant Selector was not
able to be ritualistic and defer to hard and fast rules except
those for eligibility, thus it appears that he either bent to the
whims of the politicians and Board members on whom he was dependent
for his job or housed families he considered "good." Potential
tenants for public housing generally were served only if they
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acquired political support. After 1969, the rules were more
clearly stated. However, as outlined the in previous chapter,
the CHA did not totally comply with the rules; exceptions were
made continually. The loophole category, "emergency status,"
was utilized by the Tenant Selector to respond to the same pressures
to which he had been subject under the more loosely defined rules.
Because the leaders in the organization created a climate which
encouraged, even demanded rule-breaking, the Tenant Selector had
no backing to abide by the rules. In general, in a situation
where the rules exist on paper, but no organizational support for
rules exists, the rules will be enforced selectively. Thus,
emergency status or preferred assignment was granted to favored
applicants or those who applied the most pressure; others had
the rules recited to them, waited on long lists, and were offered
the worst developments.
It would be unfair to suggest that the Tenant Selector never
responded to the most needy applicants with compassion. He is in
a position of hearing the cases of desperate people all day. He
is the only staff member in the Housing Authority who has direct
contact with people in need of public housing. Certainly the
rule-bending could be, and was, used in ways which benefited the
families most in need. But as the public housing program's
population changed, only the very needy applied. Granting favored
status to some applicants deprived others in the same circumstances
of their rights.
In winter of 1975, the political environment of the Cambridge
Housing Authority changed drastically. The new Executive Director
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placed a major emphasis upon the reform of the tenant selection
procedures. He immediately created a committee to supervise the
granting of emergency status. The 1975 Applicant Selection and
Transfer Plan, adopted in the fall of 1975, intensified the degree
of bureaucratization in the tenant selection and assignment
process, and made clear the intention of the entire staff and
Board to stand behind the rules.
The new procedures have major repercussions. Their aim is to
limit exceptions to the barest minimum and select tenants in strict
chronological order. Therefore, for the first time in CHA history,
a waiting list will be meaningful. To this end, a formal
Emergency Review Committee, established before the plan was
established, was codified. Decisions made by this committee have
tended to be based upon evidence and investigation of the cases
brought to it; emergency status has been granted only to those
families in dire emergency situations who are unable to find
alternative housing. Thus, the CHA has created a policy which
limits its use as the sole emergency housing resource for low-
income people in the city. The Emergency Review Committee, backed
by the staff and Board, is now able to refuse to respond to
political pressure. However, many of the applicants for emergency
status do have advocates in the social service agencies, which
exert the same kind of pressure on the Tenant Selector as the
Councillors previously exerted. The liberal new staff who ushered
in the new reforms are more likely to respond to social service
agencies than to entrenched politicians. Under the committee
system, however, the Tenant Selector can blame the committee for
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decisions that adversely affect the clients of the agencies,
thereby removing pressure from himself by deferring not only to
rules, but also to the bureaucratic procedure that guarantees
adherence to the rules.
The 1975 Applicant Selection plan creates difficult dilemma
for the Tenant Selection officer. It provides for the screening
and rejection of applicants very likely to cause severe problems
in housing developments.* Though the Tenant Selector has, under
earlier procedures, rejected applicants because of their social
characteristics, the new regulations and the willingness of low-
income people to go to court have placed a new emphasis on the
elimination of arbitrary measures of unacceptability. New
limitations on information, such as the inability to obtain police
records, have made it more difficult to ascertain the suitability
of applicants. Since the CHA has not denied admission to any
applicants since the late sixties, the general public and especially
advocates are not likely to respond well to these new procedures.
The tenants already housed in CHA developments, however, have
made it clear that they want to see effective screening established.
The 1975 plan, therefore, creates a situation in which the
Tenant Selector must say no to those people who do not meet strict
criteria for eligibility. Some of these people will undoubtedly
have strong backing from social service agencies or politicians.
Until standards can be clearly set, as they had to be for emergency
status, the Tenant Selector is bound to find it difficult to say
* Categories for rejection are listed in Chapter IV.
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no, for denial of any housing is surely more serious than denial
of special status. By creating strict rules to govern most
situations, and maintaining the political will within the CHA to
enforce the decisions, screening could be successful. The estab-
lishment of a screening mechanism represents the priority which
the CHA has given to the maintenance of safe, sanitary, and secure
housing for its tenants rather than to being the housing resource
of everyone in need, regardless of the impact on the housing
development. However, the actual implementation of a legally
defensible screening mechanism is expensive and difficult to
maintain, and little federal money is forthcoming to enact such
a system.
The CHA has stated its intention to strictly adhere to its
rules. In addition, the Mayor of Cambridge made a statement in
March of 1976, in which he said that he would not interfere with
the CHA's tenant selection. If both promises are kept, the tenant
selection process might be both free of political influence and
governed by the rules.
Yet the process of tenant selection, however regulated and
systematic, cannot be value-free. Political and personal pressure,
even if tenant selection is bureaucratized, will not disappear.
Some people will always make demands on the Tenant Selection officer
for special treatment. Human judgments overlay all decisions
made about people in need. There are no clear moral answers to
the questions of rules or rule-bending, or rejection or assignment
of applicants. As the decisions are made more and more by committee
and less by individuals, sympathy and morality play less of a part.
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Just as the old political machine was able to grant personal
favors which were more important to individuals than any govern-
mental reform mig't be, the rule-breaking Tenant Selection officer
could respond to the problems of the people who came to him if he
chose to do so. The rule-abiding Tenant Selection officer, on
the other hand, cannot ease the rite of entry for any particular
applicant. If it were possible for one person to weigh the
importance of all the circumstances of applicants, it would be
more responsive to the needs of applicants to have an anti-
bureaucratic Tenant Selection officer. However, it is impossible
to eliminate bias from the operations of a personal system. Rules
help to do so, and make the job of the Tenant Selection officer
less personally difficult as well.
Rules can resolve some of the personal dilemmas which the
Tenant Selection officer faces if the rules are supported by
superiors. They can help assure equal treatment for all applicants.
However, several problems are exacerbated by rules. If they exist
but are not enforced, they cannot assure equal treatment. If they
are vague, they invite abuse. If they are too restrictive they
cannot meet the needs of applicants in extraordinary circumstances.
The discussion of rules and regulations of the federal
government has shown that the initial decisions of non-intervention
by the federal government in Local Housing Authorities have been
reversed. In Cambridge, that intervention has been matched in 1975
by the bureaucratizing of the tenant selection procedures. The
rules are no longer vague. It remains to be seen whether
circumstances change to effect another swing in the pendulum.
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CHAPTER VI
OUTCOMES: THE DUAL SYSTEM EXAMINED
Tenant selection for Cambridge public housing has operated
in an informal manner which, until quite recently, was responsive
to the city's political system rather than to formal federal
requirements or the CHA's own written policy. The informal
system, which satisfied the local political and social welfare
establishments to a large degree, selected tenants from eligible
applicants and dictated where they would be placed.
This chapter will examine the outcomes of the procedures of
the Cambridge Housing Authority. It will investigate the assump-
tion that Cambridge has operated a dual public housing market from
1955 until 1975. This assumption is based upon the difference in
reputation and housing services rendered by each of Cambridge's
public housing developments. Cambridge has "good" and "bad"
projects. Good projects are stable, well-run, and clean, with few
major social problems. Bad projects are severely physically
deteriorated and have numerous social problems. The discussion in
this chapter will focus on a comparison of three federal housing
developments in Cambridge. Two developments, Putnam Gardens and
Corcoran Park, are considered to be "good" projects, although they
are located in very different sorts of neighborhoods, are different
in design, and initially had different tenant populations. One
development, Washington Elms, is considered to be "bad" by
applicants, tenants, the CHA, and the general public. It is more
typical than the other two of the deterioration and social turmoil
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which the populace has come to identify as public housing. The
three developments will be discussed in order to better understand
the nature of the dual tenant selection system. The tenant
populations from 1955 to 1975 will be analyzed to discover how the
characteristics of the population over time have influenced the
project's reputation, and how the informal and formal system ot
tenant selection operated at each project.
Housing the "Good" and "Bad" Poor
The demand for public housing in Cambridge has exceeded the
supply of units since the beginning of the program. Applicants
for public housing and the public housing tenant population have
changed during the nearly 40 years that Cambridge has operated the
program. But among the past and present tenants have been families
who were model tenants, paid their rent promptly, did not cause
trouble for their neighbors, kept their apartments clearn, and
created no maintenance problems. Other tenants have created
financial, health, security, maintenance, or social problems for
their neighbors and/or the CHA.
The Tenant Selector's responsibility historically has been to
select applicants who were likely to be good tenants and reject
those applicants likely to be poor tenants. However, as described
in Chapter V, pressures from City Councillors, the Board of
Commissioners, social service workers, and the Tenant Selector's
own sympathies allowed some "high risk" applicants to get
apartments.
Home visits and interviews provided an opportunity for subjec-
tive evaluation of applicants to make a determination whether the
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applicants were likely to be "good" or "bad" tenants. Applicants'
police records were checked. In addition, the Tenant Selector and
his staff had a good deal of personal knowledge about applicants
who, by definition, were Cambridge residents. When home visits
were discontinued in 1969 and release of police records was
prohibited by state law, evaluation of applicants was restricted
to the application interview and any personal knowledge which the
staff possessed about the applicants. The determination of "good"
and "bad" had to be made on little information. After 1971, when
the residency requirement was eliminated, the knowledge of the
staff was limited further in this evaluation, because applicants
were no longer residents of Cambridge, and therefore their family
histories were not usually known by the staff.
It is not clear that there were obvious differences between
"good" and "bad" families. Some characteristics which were imputed
to be indicative of "good," such as high incomes, two-parent
families, working parents, fewer children in the family, might
have been used to determine good-ness or bad-ness. But, among the
people who applied to public housing, the differences in these
*
characteristics were generally quite small.
It is impossible to obtain information about the people who were
not accepted as tenants. It is also not within the scope of this
thesis to gather information on tenants' attitudes and character.
Restrictions on obtaining information have made it impossible to
gather information on whether present tenants had police records,
or had political backing. Information about tenant populations
has been restricted to statistical reporting forms which were
submitted to the federal government.
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"Good" and "Bad" Developments
The various projects in Cambridge's public housing stock have
had differing reputations among the community at large, tenants,
and applicants. They are perceived as varying in amenities, design,
and location. In addition, it has generally been maintained that
the tenants in the various developments were also different. The
projects had, according to the public viewpoint, different classes
of tenants, different child densities, different degrees of
stability, and different racial compositions. The physical
characteristics of the project and the attributes of the tenants
combined to create a project's reputation in the eyes of Cambridge's
citizens. The existence of "good" projects and "bad" projects
placed heavy emphasis on the assignment process as well as the
selection process for public housing.
This chapter will examine three sets of data on each develop-
ment. First, the project's history, location, and design will be
discussed. Second, the neighborhood (U.S. Census tract) will be
evaluated. Third, the tenant populations of each development will
be compared. The information will indicate whether there has been
a difference in tenant characteristics at the three developments
and a dual assignment policy. (The aim of this analysis is to
hypothesize about the influence of the formal and informal tenant
selection systems at each development.)
Washington Elms
Washington Elms (completed in 1942) was the first Cambridge
development built with the aid of the United States Housing
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Authority under the Housing Act of 1937. It was the second
federally-aided project in Cambridge; NewTowne Court had been
completed in 1938 by the Public Works Agency. Both developments,
adjacent to each other, were constructed on cleared slum land.
They physical differences between the two are striking. NewTowne
Court, built during the Depression when labor and materials were
abundant, is sturdy and well-designed. Its walk-up apartments
are spacious and have such amenities as vestibules and hardwood
floors. The project's brick exterior and grounds are well kept.
Washington Elms, while also three-story brick buildings, is a
contrast to NewTow7ne Court. Conceived before World War II, but
built during it, Washington Elms was constructed when labor was
scarce and critical materials such as structural steel and wood
were rationed for war production. Units are smaller and afford
less privacy. Asphalt floors take the place of hardwood. To
compensate for the absence of larger units in NewTowne Court,
which only has one, two, and three bedroom apartments, Washington
Elms was built with 36 four-bedroom units. NewTowne Court cost a
total of $2,377,911 to build 294 units at a cost of $2,028 per
room. Washington Elms cost $1,877,096 to build 324 units at a
cost of $1,372 per room. The differences in quality of labor and
materials is clear from the cost differentials, which, due to
wartime price rises, are made even more substantial.
Because the project was completed during the war, and the
Boston area was a critical link in defense industry production,
Washington Elms was rented up not as low-income development, but
as housing for defense workers and servicemen. It was rapidly
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occupied in a crash program to house workers from all over the
country. After the war, over-income tenants were evicted and the
development assumed its low-income profile. Until the mid-fifties
it was one of the only two federal developments. After others
were completed, the newer developments rose on Cambridge's reputa-
tional hierarcy. Since then Washington Elms has had the reputation
of being one of the least desirable of Cambridge's projects. The
projects built after the war were smaller in size; Washington Elms
is part of a complex with over 600 poor people concentrated in one
area and it has been less popular in part because of this fact.
Washington Elms is located in a neighborhood which, by the
early twentieth century, had developed into a multi-ethnic working-
class residential and industrial community. It has been an area
of the city most receptive to new immigrants, most recently black
and Hispanic people. The project is located on a well-used street
near a series of warehouses, factories, some residential buildings,
and MIT and related research firms. It is within walking distance
of Central Square, a major commercial center. A census tract in
which it is located is the poorest in the city, with a median
income in 1970 of $6,792, compared to the city's $9,815. 26.6% of
the families in the census tract have incomes below the poverty
level, compared with 8.6% city-wide. 2 The neighborhood has a high
percentage of blacks (21.5%). 50.3% of the children live in families
with a female head; virtually all of these families receive
public assistance. The Aid to Families of Dependent Children
(AFDC) caseload is 363.9 cases per 1,000 families. 3 The census
tract ranks second in the city in tis juvenile delinquency rate
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(54.7 cases per 1,000 juveniles). Public housing (Washington Elms,
NewTowne Court) comprises 65% of the neighborhood's housing stock
and is therefore a significant influence on the neighborhood's
statistical profile. The rents in the census tract are only half
the city median ($65 for the census tract as opposed to $130 for
the city in 1975), reflecting the domination of the public housing,
which fixes rents at 25% of income. 4
The project has been a dangerous and often unpleasant place
to live for many years; the neighborhood has always been "tough."5
As early as 1955, the federal government complained of the
appearance of the grounds and filthy stairhalls at Washington Elms.6
A look at the project now would confirm the general public's
conception of public housing. Its concrete walks are litter-strewn,
many apartments look bombed out or boarded up.
It can be seen from this introduction that Washington Elms
has had design and locational handicaps. It was constructed
hurriedly and inexpensively. It is located in the poorest neighbor-
hood of the city, presently one of the most transient and crime-
ridden. It is surrounded by non-residential land uses and some
deteriorating homes. It is adjacent to another large housing
project, which thus intensifies the incidence of poverty and
problems. Little new construction of residences is occurring in
the neighborhood, although neighboring research firms are expanding.
The "good" developments are a contrast to the Washington Elms
profile.
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Putnan Gardens
Putnam Gardens is a small (123 unit) development located in
Riverside, an area of Cambridge which was marshland or farmland
until the Civil War era. The neighborhood around Putnam Gardens
is now residential and commercial. It is the only conventional
public housing in the vicinity, but is across the street from a
large complex of Harvard married student housing (Peabody Terrace)
and near a new mixed-income development (808 Memorial Drive). The
Riverside census tract ranks only behind the Washington Elms area
in having the lowest median income in the city ($7,774); 16.6% of
its families have incomes below poverty level. The AFDC caseload
is 111.3 cases per 1,000 families, much higher than the city-wide
figure (74.9 cases/1,000) but far less than the Washington Elms
neighborhood figure of 363.9 cases/l,000. The area is mixed
racially. About 32% of the residents in the census tract are
black. It has the highest juvenile delinquency rate in the city
(101.5 cases/1,000 juveniles). 8  83% of the persons in the
neighborhood are renters, but despite the area's low incomes,
the median rent in 1975 was $140, more than the city median of $130.
Since 1950, rents in Cambridge have risen 256%, but Riverside rents
have increased by 472%. Riverside has been greatly affected by its
proximity to Harvard and has attracted students and young people
willing to pay more rent than families. Peabody Terrace certainly
has also exerted a large influence on the neighborhood, for it
houses smaller families with temporarily low incomes. Putnam
Gardens comprises only 11% of the area's housing units and has
much less influence on the rest of the neighborhood than Washington
Elms/NewTowne Court have on their surroundings.
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Putnam Gardens has an interesting history. Before its
construction in 1955, none of Cambridge's projects had been built
in neighborhoods with large black populations. The Washington
Elms/NewTowne Court complex had displaced large numbers of black
residents, but apartments were rented mainly to whites. With the
Housing Act of 1949, displacees from low-rent projects were to be
given preference for apartments, so in theory the same injustice
could not occur. When Putnam Gardens was built, the neighborhood
was mixed racially, but one side of Putnam Avenue was all-black
and the other, all-white. The project was constructed on the black
side of the street but intended for mixed racial occupancy. A
number of wood frame homes were destroyed to build the project;
all but one of the 68 families living in them were black. According
to the present manager, the rest of the city was "smug" when
Putnam Gardens was built because of its location. 1 0  The citizens
of other areas of the city expected it to fail. Significantly,
the Tenant Selection officer has said that very little political
pressure was exerted to influence the rent-up of Putnam Gardens,
for everyone, including City Councillors, expected failure or
expected the development to become all black. Twenty-one of the
relocated families moved into the project. Its initial occupancy
was 38% black and 62% white.
Unlike Washington Elms, Putnam Gardens has a good reputation
despite its inauspicious beginning. It is well-kept; in fact, its
exterior is in better condition than much of the neighborhood.
The project faces a main street (Putnam Avenue) but is not as
centrally located as Washington Elms. It is adjacent to a public
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school, private two- and three-decker houses, Peabody Terrace,
and some small commercial and industrial buildings. Unlike
Washington Elms, it has not experienced much crime, vandalism,
or anti-social behavior. Its racially mixed occupants have
almost never exhibited hostility toward each other.
The project is very much like the rest of the neighborhood.
Its three-story brick buildings blend with other structures. The
project is well built, but without frills. It cost $1,783,245
to complete in 1955; the per-room cost was $2,155. Like
Washington Elms, six apartments are located at each doorway. The
development appears neat and clean. One could easily pass by it
and not recognize it as a "project."
In summary, several major differences are apparent between
Washington Elms and Putnam Gardens. Putnam Gardens was built in
a period when materials were available for construction. It is
only one-third the size of Washington Elms and is not near any
other public housing. Its surroundings are more stable in racial
make-up and class. The neighborhood is being upgraded and new
residential construction (i.e., Peabody Terrace) has not ceased.
A look at Corcoran Park will provide additional insight.
Corcoran Park
Corcoran Park is one of the most popular of Cambridge's housing
developments, and has certainly been the most popular federal family
development. Its location and design are quite different than the
other two projects under investigation. It is located in a
practically all-white neighborhood. (In 1970, it had 0.7% black,
no Spanish-speaking persons) with socio-economic characteristics
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much closer to the city norms.'1 By 1975, the neighborhood had
a 6% black population. 1 2 The median income of the census tract
in which Corcoran Park is located was only $40 less than the city
median in 1970. Only 7% of its families are below the poverty
level. 64% of its residents are renters, as opposed to 94% in
the Washington Elms neighborhood and 83% in the Riverside census
tract. Median rent in 1975 was $101 per month. The neighborhood
AFDC caseload is 46.8 cases per 1,000 families, fewer than the
citywide average of 74.9 cases/1,000 families and much fewer than
the other census tracts examined. Its juvenile delinquency rate
(14.1 cases/l,000) is below the city average of 22.8 cases per
131,000 juveniles.-
Unlike the other three developments aided by the federal
government, Corcoran Park was built on vacant land. Because of
the smaller cost for acquiring and preparing vacant land, the
project is less dense and of a row-house style architecture
rather than three-floor walk-ups. Each family has their own
front and back doorway as well as an upstairs and downstairs
living area, a backyard and a front year. The per-room cost at
Corcoran Park was $1,837. The wood and brick row-house style
blends with the single and two-family detached dwellings which
surround the development. The area is largely residential and
suburban in character. It is on the outskirts of Cambridge, near
the Belmont city line, but not far from public transportation,
shopping and recreation facilities. It does not, however, front
on any main streets.
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Corcoran Park has always been popular. Before it opened,
over 300 applications were on file for its 152 apartments. It is
a development which required political pull to get in when it was
first occupied and continues to be a "reward" for tenants. Its
design, which affords more privacy and space than other apartments
in Cambridge public housing, and its location in a middle-class
neighborhood have contributed to this popularity. It is also the
project which, until recently, appeared to be isolated from-black
tenants. It has been considered a great success of public housing
by Cambridge citizens.
It is apparent from this discussion of location, design, and
history, that the three developments under investigation have
different backgrounds. It is thus impossible to claim that
differences in reputation are due solely to differences in tenant
composition, or incidence of problem tenants.
OUTCOMES: COMPARISON OF TENANT POPULATIONS
In the previous section, the physical differences between the
three projects were described. The nieghborhood social character-
istics were also elaborated. In this section, differences between
the tenant populations at the three developments will be investigated
to determine whether there have been any significant differences
among these populations over the past 20 years. Through an
examination of this information, it is possible to determine
whether indeed there has been a difference between the three
developments over the years with regard to the above varibles.
The differences between the tenant compositions at the three
Table 6.1
SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS
CAMBRIDGE AND CENSUS TRACTS, 1971
City 3524 (WE) 3535 (PG)
# Children per Family
Ave. Family Size
Juvenile Population
(% ages 7-16)
Female-Headed Families (%)
with pre-school & school-age
children
Children in Female-Headed
Families (under 18) (%)
Elderly Population (%)
Black Population (%)
Population Density
(persons/acre)
Juvenile Delinquency
(juvenile cases brought to
court per 1,000 juveniles)
AFDC Caseload (per 1,000
families)
.95
3.2
12.3%
7.9%
17.3%
11.6%
6.8%
64.6
22.8/1,000
74.9/1,000
1.67
3.75
30.5%
32.8%
50.3%
13.2%
21.4%
101.8
54.7/1,000
363.9/1,000
1.02
3.22
12.2%
15.7%
32.0%
8.8%
32.0%
76.3
101.5/1,000
111.3/1,000
.92
3.33
12.9%
2.7%
6.5%
14.0%
.7%
39.5
14.1/1,000
46.8/1,000
Source: Cambridge Planning and Development Department, Social Characteristics of Cambridge,
1971.
3543 (CP)
HL~J
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developments and their implications for political intervention in
the tenant selection system will be discussed in the following
*
sections.
THE VARIABLES
Age of Head of Household/Average Family Size
Figure 6.1 shows the trends in age of the head of the household
for each of the three developments under investigation. Tenants
are steadily getting older at Putnam Gardens and Corcoran Park.
This reflects the aging of long-term tenants. The average family
size has also decreased steadily (Figure 6.2) for the same reason.
The young families who moved into these public housing developments
when they were built have gotten older, and their children have
grown up and left home.
At Washington Elms, the trend toward older families was
interrupted in 1973, when three new developments for the elderly
were opened in Cambridge. 58% of Washington Elms' elderly
residents left the development at that time. Because of the large
numbers of vacancies which the elderly left at Washington Elms,
the families which took the place of the elderly tenants made a
significant difference in the age profile of the development.
Putnam Gardens lost 35% of its elderly residents in 1973. Corcoran
Park, which has a special building for elderly occupants, did not
experience the same turnover as the other two developments.
Average family size has decreased steadily, as has the number
of minors in each family (Figure 6.3). The size of families in
* See Appendix for Methodology.
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public housing, however, has consistently been larger than families
in the city as a whole.
Turnover
Turnover rates (calculated as the proportion of vacated units
to occupied units) have varied significantly between the three
developments. Figure 6.4 shows the disparity between the
developments' turnover rates. Washington Elms historically has
experienced a high rate of turnover. From 1954-59, it averaged
18% per year; from 1960-69, it averaged 14%; from 1970-75, it
averaged 17%. Turnover at Putnam Gardens and Corcoran Park has
been, incontrast, quite low. During the 1960s, turnover in
Putnam Gardens was as high as 13%, but it decreased in the early
1970s to 8%. Corcoran Park's turnover has increased. It averaged
7% from 1954-59; 9% from 1960-69; and 10% from 1970-75.
Turnover rates are predictors of the pace at which change can
take place. A development which has few vacancies each year
cannot undergo rapid change in tenantry. On the other hand, a
large turnover rate can lead to rapid change in characteristics
of tenants.
Racial Composition
The racial composition of these develcpments shows a dramatic
difference in the projects over time. Both Washington Elms and
Corcoran Park were nearly all white in 1955. Putnam Gardens was
38% black at that time. As is clear from Figure 6.5, the percen-
tage of minority residents has climbed significantly since 1968.
Washington Elms has rapidly become a predominantly minority
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occupied development since 1968. Both Putnam Gardens and
Corcoran Park have experienced increases in their minority
populations since that time, but the rate of change has been less
rapid, at least in part due to their low turnover rates.
Washington Elms' minority population has grown from 20% to
almost 60% in seven years. This change is felt by applicants: 74%
of white applicants offered Washington Elms apartments in the first
seven months of 1975 refused to move there. 1 4 But 50% of the black
families assigned to Washington Elms also refused to move there.
The Hispanic population has grown in Washington Elms from only
two families in 1959 to 39 families (13.7%) in 1975.
It is interesting to note that the minority population in the
Cambridge Housing Authority's housing developments rose sharply
with the enforcement of the 1-2-3 rule in 1969. Putnam Gardens
was maintained as a racially-mixed development throughout the
entire period under investigation, and the increases after 1969
did not lead to increased turnover. Corcoran Park, on the other
hand, still has only a small percentage of minority families
compared to the other developments. Its location in an almost
all-white neighborhood is influential in this regard.
Income
Family income has risen over the twenty years under study in
each development, and in the city at large. (Figure 6.6, 6.7)
Despite the differences in turnover, age of the head of household,
family size, and racial composition, the average and median income
statistics do not vary significantly. According to a one-tailed
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t-test, the only significant difference between developments in
mean incomes is in 1960, between Washington Elms and the other two
developments. (Significant at the .05 level.)
Per capita income (Figure 6.8) is also not significantly
different among the developments. All of the developments' income
profiles rise at approximately the same rate.
Because of the limitations on income for eligibility, it is
not surprising that these differences are not significant. It is
also possible that the information on income is not very reliable.
Rent is calculated on the basis of income, so tenants have a
monetary incentive to underestimate income.
Source of Income
Since 1955, there has been a decrease in the number of working
heads of households in the three developments, and an increase in
the number of families receiving their incomes from other sources
(primarily public assistance). (Figure 6.9 and 6.10) The trend
does not appear to be evenly paced among the three developments.
Washington Elms has had the largest increase in households
receiving Aid to Families of Dependent Children (AFDC) and a
concomitant decrease in the number of working heads of households.
Corcoran Park has had a higher rate of working heads of households
and the lowest percentage of AFDC recipients until 1975. Putnam
Gardens has experienced an opposite trend since 1969. Since 1969,
the number of workers has increased and the number of AFDC
recipients has decreased. By 1975, Putnam Gardens and Corcoran
Park had similar proportions of working and AFDC families.
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Although income has not varied greatly among the developments,
source of that income has been quite different. In particular,
Corcoran Park has had a very low rate of AFDC recipients until
recently. The percentage of AFDC families is also indicative of
the number of households headed by females and the number of adult
males in the development. Since 1969, Washington Elms has had the
highest rate of AFDC recipients (39% in 1969, 42% in 1975). It
has been shown by Scobie that female-headed households have a
higher rate of problem tenancy in public housing.15 The differences
between the developments in this variable may be indicative of the
incidence of problem tenancy.
Rent
Because rent is set as a proportion of income, one would
expect the correspondence between income and rent indicated in
Figure 6.11. The high 1967-68 rents do not, however, reflect the
lower income levels at Washington Elms, for a flat welfare rent of
$65 was in effect at that time. Since the welfare benefit for a
woman and two children was only approximately $2,200 at that time,
$65 represented 35% of her gross income. The Brooke Amendment's
recalculations of rents are reflected in the 1975 rent figures,
which correlate more directly with the average income figures in
6.6
Summary of Findings
In summary, only a few findings are significant in understanding
the differences between developments with good reputations and
those with bad reputations. Family size, number of minors per
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family, income and rent are not significant factors. Important
differences in turnover rates, the ratio of working families and
AFDC recipients, and the pace of racial change and the age of the
head of the household are apparent from the data. The good
developments have had lower turnover rates, higher percentages of
working families and lower percentages of AFDC families, and only
gradual racial or social change. It is important to point out
that one good development is predominantly occupied by black
families, which demonstrates that the race of the occupants
themselves is not as important a factor in determining good-ness
or bad-ness as racial turnover. Age of the head of household
varies with turnover, especially the outflow of elderly tenants.
TENANT POPULATIONS AND THE FORMAL/INFORMAL SYSTEM
The three developments under consideration are clearly different
in design, location, and neighborhood influences. Their tenant
populations have differed as shown above, in several important
respects. In order to pursue the discussion of a dual system
further, it is interesting to compare the outcomes of the tenant
selection system as evidenced by the data collected with the inter-
vention of politicians and social workers described in Chapter V.
An informal system controlled tenant selection and assignment
since the beginning of the program. The informal system was manip-
ulated by politicians for most of the life of the program, but
manipulation has in large part been taken over by social service
workers in recent years. The timing and extent of the shift in
influence over the informal system varied from development to
development.
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The next section will explore hypotheses about the shift in
manipulation, the imposition of formal rules by the federal
government, and the influence of neighborhood effects and general
trends on the populations of Washington Elms, Putnam Gardens, and
Corcoran Park. The scenarios which follow are possible explana-
tions of the relationship of the formal and informal system of
tenant selection and the outcomes, as evidenced by the data
presented above.
General Trends
Since the mid-fifties, the characteristics of public housing
tenants in Cambridge has shifted from working families with inccmes
very similar to the city median (Figure 6.7) to dependent poor
families with only one-third of the city's median income in 1975.
This disparity between the city and the tenants in CHA developments
has also grown with respect to racial composition and welfare
dependency.
As the tenant population and the general public's opinion of
public housing has shifted, so has the applicant pool. The type
of families who had lived in public housing during the early 1950s
have stopped applying. The market for public housing in Cambridge
has become dominated by very poor welfare recipients and, increas-
ingly, minority families. Perhaps this change has been in part
due to community organizing in poor neighborhoods, which encouraged
large numbers of eligible families to apply for welfare assistance
and public housing. Perhaps the shift has reflected an abandonment
of the city for the suburbs by the same type of families who had
previously chosen to live in public housing.
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.The change in the market has been a mirror for the change in
tenant populations. The changes in the developments have been
apparent to the general public; racial change and physical
deterioration of the structures and grounds have been visible.
High crime rates in the housing have become legend. Thus, the
"good" families of the past, particularly white families, have had
large disincentive to apply for public housing.
Washington Elms
Until 1968, Washington Elms had experienced the most rapid
turnover of tenants, a modest rate of racial change, and- the
largest shift in its residents' source of income compared to the
other two developments under study. Since 1968, the rate of change
of each of these variables has continued to increase faster than
in the other two developments.
Until 1968, the racial composition of the development grew
quite slowly, stabilizing at under 20% minority. After 1968, the
black and Hispanic population rose dramatically. This shift can
be viewed as the interaction of five variables: the abandonment
of Washington Elms by the political system, the concurrent take-
over by social workers of the informal assignment system, shift in
the market for public housing, neighborhood factors, and the
imposition of formal rules by the federal government regarding
equal opportunity in housing.
The neighborhood and market changes were addressed earlier in
this chapter. The neighborhood around Washington Elms was
becoming poorer and increasingly crime-ridden by the mid-1960s.
The trend in the development toward more welfare families had been
154
in evidence since 1955. These changes led to the abandonment of
Washington Elms by families who sought political intervention and
eventually by white people in general. The political system
ceased to exercise influence over assignment to Washington Elms
because it was no longer pressured to do so. Social welfare
agencies filled the void left by City Councillors. Their clients
were more likely to be minority group members and/or welfare
families. Social workers' clients may have been different than
politically-sponsored applicants. By definition they were people
with problems, in many cases only financial problems, but often
mental, emotional, and physical problems.
Federal enforcement of equal opportunity provisions and the
1-2-3 rule after 1968 also helped to accelerate the changes at
Washington Elms. Because of the high turnover rate at Washington
Elms, it was the first development offered under the 1-2-3 rule.
Its high rate of refusal by white families who were able to wait
led to its large minority population. The informal system, having
been attacked by formal rules, responded by creating a dumping
ground out of one of its already unpopular developments. From a
political and practical standpoint, Washington Elms was the
development most vulnerable to these changes. It was located in
a racially mixed neighborhood. Its design, locational deficiencies,
and size had already labelled it a "bad" project. By 1968, it had
a large welfare population. In addition, because of its high
turnover rate, it was possible to house significant numbers of
minority families in a short time, thus showing to the federal
government a good faith attempt at integration without seriously
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interfering with the informal political system at other "good"
developments.
Thus, the informal system responded to formal pressures, and
the social welfare establishment took over the informal assignment
process as families with political clout chose not to live in
Washington Elms. The profile of Washington Elms tenants reflects
the change in population which these shifts imply.
Putnam Gardens
Putnam Gardens provides an interesting contrast to Washington
Elms. It opened in 1954 with a tenant population which, according
to popular belief: should have doomed it to failure. It had the
largest family size and the most minors per family of the three
developments under investigation; its residents were almost 40%
black; they had the lowest incomes in the system; and the highest
percentage of AFDC families. But Putnam Gardens has not failed.
It appears to have been rescued by both the formal and informal
systems. In fact its tenant profile has improved since 1968, a
period during which the profiles of the other developments have
declined.
The evolution of the formal and informal system with respect
to Putnam Gardens is particularly interesting. As stated previously,
very little political influence was exerted over tenant selection
at Putnam Gardens when it was first rented up. The lack of
influence allowed the bureaucratic process as written to function.
Therefore, it is likely that the original tenants were indeed
those families with the greatest housing need among displacees and
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veterans, a fact which is verified by the low incomes, high
dependency rates, and large minority representation in the
population.
The high proportion of minority tenants was due to three
factors. First, Putnam Gardens' location in a minority neighbor-
hood led to its desirability among black applicants. Second,
federal laws and regulations required displacees from public housing
sites to be granted preference for units. Twenty-one of the
original tenants were black site displacees. Third, the CHA was
under a political obligation to provide an appreciable number of
units for black tenants. The black community had been angered by
the absence of black tenants in other public housing developments
despite the displacement of blacks to build them, and exerted its
influence to ensure that the new housing was occupied by a substan-
tial number of blacks. The strong support of the city's black
community has contributed to the stability of the development over
the years.
The federal government intervened early in Putnam Gardens'
history through an informal agreement with the Tenant Selection
officer to place racial occupancy controls on the development.
While these occupancy controls existed, the proportion of minority
to white tenants remained very stable. As the racial stability
of the development became apparent, political influence over
assignments became more commonplace. The proportion of blacks
began to rise again after 1968. This increase in minority
population was not a result of the abandonment of the white
political system of what had once been "their" development, as
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had been the case in Washington Elms. On the contrary, politicians
continued to exert influence over assignments to Putnam Gardens.
Liberal black City Councillors influenced admissions to the
development.
The formal system also influenced the tenant population at
Putnam Gardens. The 1-2-3 rule necessitated the removal of
occupancy controls. Because of the popularity of Putnam Gardens
among black applicants and the continuing informal operation of
the tenant selection process, the percentage of black occupants
rose. Putnam Gardens was not one of the first developments
offered under the 1-2-3 rule, for its turnover rate was quite low
by 1968. Therefore, only a small percentage of families received
apartments there through regular assignment procedures. Most got
support from a Council member.
In addition, the federal government did not interfere with
tenant selection at Putnam Gardens because it was integrated. The
lack of interference allowed the informal system to continue. The
continued influence of politicians as well as neighborhood factors
have been important variables in the improvement of Putnam Gardens
since 1968. Of course, general trends in the public housing
market are obvious at Putnam Gardens. While the figures may show
improvement since 1968, the proportions of welfare families, very
poor families, and large families are much higher than the general
population of the city.
The contrast to Washington Elms is clear. Washington Elms
was a bad development before it was a minority development.
Putnam Gardens overcame its prediction of bad-ness in part because
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of the informal system which prevented rapid segregation.
Improvements in neighborhood conditions have contributed to the
upswing in Putnam Gardens' profile. The neighborhood has been
improving rather than declining. Rents have gone up in the
private market. The minority population has decreased from 32%
black in 1970 to 20% black in 1975, so the neighborhood has never
"tipped," yet the neighborhood is a center of the black community.
New residential building has occurred. The continued interest
on the part of politicians has kept the proportion of "good"
tenants high, and problems minimal.
Corcoran Park
Corcoran Park began its history with every advantage. Its
scale and design were ideal for privacy and community. Its location
in a middle-class neighborhood assured that the surroundings would
have a positive influence on the development. Its initial
population scored higher on social indicators than the other two
developments under investigation. It had the smallest number of
minors per family, the highest family and per capita income, a
very high percentage of working fathers, a low percentage of
welfare recipients and female-headed households. Its minority
population was miniscule; it remained less than 5% minority until
1968.
Corcoran Park has enjoyed its label as a "good" development
since before it opened. Despite its recent decline in social
indicators, as evidenced by the data presented in this chapter,
it maintains the reputation as one of the best places to live in
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Cambridge public housing. The development has been, because of
its great desirability, the exclusive province of Cambridge
politicians. It has been the most middle-class in attitude, if
not in income, of all Cambridge's family public housing, and the
home of "good" tenants.
The shift in influence over the tenant selection system from
politicians to social service workers probably never occurred in
Corcoran Park. Its position as the best public housing in
Cambridge guaranteed a strong market demand for units among people
who could command the support of a politician. There was no
slack in demand, as there had been at Washington Elms, which
allowed social service workers to increase their influence over
the assignment process. The number of vacancies which occurred
each year was small; political intervention on behalf of only a
few constituents was sufficient to fill these few apartments.
The informal system influenced by politicians, however, came
under direct attack during the controversy over equal opportunity
in 1968. The segregation at Corcoran Park was cited as evidence
that the CHA did not operate an open housing system. The increase
in minority representation at the development from 1969 to 1975
has been in part related to the formal pressure brought by HUD to
enforce the Civil Rights Act. The growth of minority families
at Corcoran Park has been slow but steady since 1969.
In recent years, the relative advantage which Corcoran Park
has in social indicators has narrowed. Corcoran Park is becoming
much like other developments in the CHA's stock. It has matched
Putnam Gardens in many variables. Its income, percentage of working
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families, and percentage of welfare families are much like the
other two developments. Its income level has not been substantially
different from the other developments since 1960, although it has
consistently been a bit higher. Certainly Corcoran Park no
longer houses the same type of temporarily poor folk who occupied
the development when it opened, whose incomes were much like the
city median. As stated earlier, those families are no longer
interested, for the most part, in public housing.
Summary
This chapter has traced a demographic history of three
developments operated by the Cambridge Housing Authority in an
attempt to identify the kinds of differences which contribute to
project reputation and in turn influence the tenant selection and
assignment process.
The three developments are quite different in design, size,
location, neighborhood surroundings, and age. The two "good"
developments are smaller, have more desirable spatial and physical
characteristics, and younger. Washington Elms and Putnam Gardens
are both located in high-crime and poor neighborhoods, but Putnam
Gardens, a "good" project, is located in a neighborhood which is
experiencing a revival. Both Washington Elms and Putnam Gardens
are in racially-mixed areas of the city. Corcoran Park is located
in a nearly all-white area which exhibits social characteristics
much like the city average.
The tenant populations in the three developments have been
quite different in the past with respect to racial composition,
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proportions of working and welfare families. Most recently they
have had different aged families as well. But most of the
variables examined did not show significant differences among
developments. Turnover has been quite different in each develop-
ment, in part in direct correspondence to the reputation of the
development and the value which individual tenants placed on a
housing unit in it.
The differences among the developments has prompted different
political intervention for constituents. Politicians' influence
has waned at Washington Elms, because families who can get political
support want to go elsewhere. Social service workers have replaced
politicians for Washington Elms' advocacy. Putnam Gardens,
because of its location and history, did not require political
influence during initial rent-up, but as it was the only develop-
ment for a long period of time which housed many minority families,
it became the "good" black development and as such required
political influence to get an apartment. Corcoran Park has
required political influence since the project was conceived. It
continues to be the place for which "good" white families request
political help. But the importance of political influence in
general has decreased as the applicant pool has become composed of
families who do not demand political influence, but rather get
assistance from their social workers.
While politicians did not operate a system which was fair or
equitable, political influence over tenant selection in Cambridge
did help to expedite the housing of applicants who were organized
enough to seek political intervention. Social workers advocate for
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different reasons. While they may indeed help people with more
need than the politicians helped, these people may also bring the
most insurmountable problems to the public housing setting.
Advocacy by social service workers may have had graver social
repercussions for public housing than that done by politicians.
Perhaps the non-intervention of politicians in the tenant
selection system from the beginning might have created a system
which was more balanced in its distribution of "good" and "bad"
developments and tenants than the present distribution. However,
the influences of other factors, such as design, size, location,
and expectations of reputation by the city, may have mitigated
against a balancing of reputations and populations.
The changes in the market among public housing applicants
cannot be underestimated in Cambridge. Given the composition of
the waiting list and the intention of the reform Cambridge
Housing Authority to pay strict attention to chronological order
in housing applicants, the composition of its housing developments
will undoubtedly change in accordance to the changes in the waiting
list. Such a change means a further increase in minority families
and welfare families. The pace of such a change, as evidenced by
the differences among the three developments investigated with
respect to this variable, is an important factor in the maintenance
of community reputation and stability. In addition, without
outreach to some types of families underrepresented on CHA waiting
lists, the pace will not be controllable. Specifically, racial
change will accelerate and perhaps cause massive turnover in
predominately white developments. Marketing to white families and
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working families may be the only recourse to finding the mix of
low-income families which the 1974 Housing and Community Development
Act mandates.
The following chapter will discuss the future of the foraml
and informal system.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSIONS
This paper has discussed the history of the formal and
informal systems which guided the selection of tenants for public
housing in Cambridge. The formal system of federal statutes,
regulations, and local official policy has historically been
quite flexible. Moreover, the formal system has been silent
on many important issues requiring resolution on the local level.
Because neither the federal, state, nor local rules adequately
addressed the four major issues of tenant selection (race, income,
priority order, and basis for rejection) , an informal system
developed in Cambridge. This informal network circumvented
the loosely written rules and found a way of operationalizing
the four salient issues of tenant selection. The informal system
provided for the selection of applicants who had advocates.
The development of this informal system fits Robert Merton's
model of the latent and manifest functions of an agency.* Merton
states that the functional deficiencies of the official structure
generate an alternative, unofficial structure to fulfill existing
needs more effectively.1
*The manifest function of the Cambridge Housing Authority, according
to Merton's model, is to provide low-income families with decent,
safe, and sanitary homes at rents they can afford. The latent
functions, fulfilled by the existence of the informal system, are
to maintain good relations with the city (which includes patronage
in the form of apartments, jobs, and contracts), to maintain
patterns of racial and income segregation which do not disrupt the
status quo, and to house "'good" poor folk.
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The actors in the informal system which influenced the CHA's
tenant selection procedures were of two types: politicians and
social welfare workers. Each manipulated the system in their
own personal or institutional interest. Politicians operated a
a personalized system of advocacy. The families for which they
advocated represented a network of campaign workers and their
families, old friends, relatives, and neighbors. The politician
generally took a personal interest in his constituents in public
housing. He also was considered personally responsible for their
actions, and did intervene when a tenant whom he had sponsored
became a problem at a development.
The informal system which social workers and legal service
agencies irfluenced operated quite differently. While social
service workers took a professional interest in their clients,
their personal interest was likely to be minimal. Unlike the
politicians, the social workers were generally of a different
class and social background than their clients. Moreover, social
workers did not claim responsibility for their clients once they
were housed. Unlike politically sponsored applicants, who "be-
longed"' to a certain City Councillor, tenants who were sponsored
by social service agencies did not "owe" their sponsors anything.
The increase in social service workers' advocacy for applicants
contributed to a cycle of housing "bad" tenants at some developments.
The social workers had influence, however, only at the developments
in which the politicians were no longer interested.
The informal system was fortified by the federal government's
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role in the public housing program. The federal government often
neglected to state clear positions on important issues. Further-
more, it was reluctant to interfere with and monitor the practices
of the Cambridge Housing Authority. Until 1968, the formal system
had only slight influence over the operation of local tenant
selection or the informal system which controlled it.
The federal Department of Housing and Urban Development
intervened in the CHA's practices regarding equal opportunity,
in an attempt to eliminate the gaps between federal rules and
local practice. The intervention did increase the number of
minority tenants in Cambridge public housing. But, because of
the influence of the informal system, the intervention helped
to intensify the stratification of the public housing system.
Developments which were already considered "bad" were used to
respond to federal pressure to quickly house more black and
Hispanic families.
The enforcement of federal rules, such as regulations
regarding the due process rights of rejected applicants, did
not abolish the informal system, but merely modified it. "Bad"
applicants, previously rejected, were now shuffled to "bad"
developments. Since bad developments generally had high turn-
over, they were the first places offered under the 1-2-3 rule.
Applicants who did not have the political clout or resources to
gain exemption to the 1-2-3 rule were assigned there. "Good"
applicants with political sponsors were excepted from the rules
and got assigned to good developments. Social service workers
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primarily had access only to bad developments for their clients.
The existence of an informal system which determined tenant
selection meant that the formal rules were followed only when
necessary, specifically, when the Authority was monitored by
the federal government. Because the supervising agencies audited
the income and rent of public housing tenants, it is unlikely
that the informal system often violated the formal federal rules
regarding income eligibility or rent.
Vague or undefined issues of tenant selection were subject
to local interpretation. Local procedures were largely controlled
by the informal system. Therefore, the gap was great between
policy intended by Congress and its implementation at the local
level. Is-ues were not addressed by the federal government for
several reasons: the desire to encourage flexibility at the local
and national level, an inability to gain concensus on an issue,
the influence of pressure groups upon the legislative process.
For example, the federal agencies which supervised public
housing took no official position on racial discrimination until
1965. CHA, guided by its informal system, chose generally not to
upset the existing racial composition of neighborhoods in -selecting
sites and tenants for its public housing. The lack of federal
direction regarding racial discrimination helped to bolster the
status qio of the city and in turn foster discrimination against
minority applicants. In spite of federal regulations issued in
1965, CHA continued to assign tenants as it had in the past. Only
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when the Department of Housing and Urban Development began to
monitor CHA's procedures did the racial make-up of Cambridge's
developments begin to change.
Because priority order was established in statute and
regulation, but not monitored by federal agencies, the procedure
was not followed by the CHA. Indeed, the informal system completely
overruled priority order. After the 1-2-3 rule, emergency prior-
ity constituted a large percentage of assignments, so the Cambridge
practice of determining entry by a form other than that dictated
by the federal government continued.
The federal government must have known that most localities
were selecting tenants in a political manner. It chose not to
change that fact. Perhaps the federal government recognized
that it could not alter the established political networks at
the local level by formal rules. Yet HUD continues to impose
more requirements upon local authorities without apparent recog-
nition of the actual forces which dictate assignment and selection
at the local level. The tenant selection provisicns of the
Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 demonstrate this
point.
The Act goes much further in establishing social engineering
than did the equal opportunity provisions of the late sixties.
Congress' response to the sinking level of income of public
housing tenants nationwide was to direct.Local Housing Authorities
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to alter the social composition of their tenant populations.*
The development of housing projects with a cross-section of
low-income families may well become mythical. Given the deteriorated
physical plant of many housing developments, the high crime rates,
sites in the poorest and most stressful neighborhoods of cities,
and the range of other alternatives available to moderate-income
households, the likelihood of attracting them back to public
housing is small. Perhaps it would be possible to develop a
social mix in the housing developments with the lowest turnover,
highest percentage of working families, and least incidence of
serious crime, since the social characteristics most prevelant in
these projects are in less abundance on the waiting lists. Certainly
giving priority to applicants who are in the upper scales of "low-
income" would be an incentive to get these families to apply to
public housing. However, it is doubtful that most families who
are not desperate will accept housing in the most dangerous and
deteriorated developments. Because many of the moderate-income
applicants would have access to a politician, the continued existence
of the informal advocacy network would be guaranteed. This would
also serve to further intensify the stratified public housing
system.
Certainly the definition of "serious social problems" is. not
readily available. It is not always obvious from an application,
*The law requires that Local Housing Agencies establish "tenant
selection criteria designed to assure that within a reasonable
time period, the project will include families with a broad range
of incomes and will avoid concentrations of low-income and deprived
families with serious social problems..."2
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an interview, or a reference check whether a family will cause
serious trouble when they move to public housing. Furthermore,
evidence indicates that there is a fine line between a tolerable
number of troublesome tenants and the outflow of those "good"
tenants who perceive the trouble multiplying. A serious long
range question is clear when one examines the waiting list for
a large city housing authority. Many of the people who request
public housing have problems, be they social, mental, physical,
marital, or emotional. Screening is a useless exercise if the
market for "normal" families is limited. Screening is very
time consuming, expensive, and difficult to carry out within
the letter of the law. The executive decisions which were
carried out to reject problem tenants previous to the mid-sixties
were illegal and often unjust. But by rejecting some applicants,
it was possible to minimize the number of problem tenants. The
screening outlined in the 1974 Act is, by contrast to the screening
done in the past, judicial in nature. Each LHA is expected to
underwrite the cost of providing an extensive legally defensible
written rejection, hearing, and perhaps further appeal, for ap-
plicants.
Despite the federal government's plan to change the composi-
tion of the public housing tenant population, measures to correct
the failures of public housing await a Congress and administration
willing to commit major energy and funds to run the program. The
trend toward relatively poorer and more troubled tenants has been
relentless. Local practice in Cambridge held the trends at bay
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for many years in some developments, but the informal mechanisms
which accomplished this have been condemned by courts, tenants
organizations, and reformers.
The reform Cambridge Housing Authority is in a position to
test whether enforcement of rules can create a healthy public
housing system. The task is onerous, and nearly forty years of
Cambridge history would indicate that a reversal of the informal
system which has chosen tenants in the past is not without its
problems. The manner in which the CHA relates to the city must
be changed. If conditions in CHA housing improve, and the pop-
ularity of public housing increases enough to attract moderate-
income households again, it is unlikely that City Hall will remain
aloof from the operations of the CHA. Politicians have withdrawn
only when the demand for their influence has waned. It is problem-
matic for CHA to both revitalize public housing and ignore
political influence in tenant selection. As the commodity becomes
more attractive, the competition for it is likely to increase;
rekindling the interest of politicians is a byproduct of improve-
ment.
On the other hand, if the housing conditions continue to
decline, public housing will further sink in the eyes of Cambridge's
eligible population. This eventually would be conducive to
elimination of the informal system, certainly the informal system
dominated by politicians, for they would not be pressured to
provide apartments for constituents in great numbers. However,
social service workers might come to dominate the informal system.
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Given the propensity of liberal reformers to reply to neediness
rather than familial or ethnic contacts, the potency of the
social workers' influence would be felt.
These possible scenarios demonstrate the difficulty in
eliminating the informal system, for it serves a real function to
the consumers of the program, and to the program itself. Even
with strict adherence to rules, as long as there are fewer
apartments than applicants, it is unlikely that the informal
system of tenant selection can be eliminated completely. The
latent functions fulfilled by that system must also be served
or, as Merton has stated, reformers will be practicing social
ritual rather than social engineering.3
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Footnotes -- Chapter VII
1. Robert K Merton, On Theoretical Sociology (New York: The Free
Press, 1967), p. 127.
2. Housing and Community Development Act of 1974. Public Law
93-383. 93rd Congress.
3. Robert J. Merton, op. cit., p. 135.
APPENDIX
METHODOLOGY FOR COMPARISON OF TENANT POPULATIONS
The data used to examine the tenant populations at the three
developments has come from two sources. Turnover of apartments
and complete racial information was obtained from the Report on
Occupancy (Form 1235) filed quarterly with the federal government.
Most of the remaining information was taken from a second reporting
form which was also submitted quarterly to the federal government:
Report on the Regular Reexamination of Tenants in Low Rent Housing
Form 1245). The reports from this series which provided the most
complete information were submitted in September of the reporting
year, except in 1975, when a complete survey was done in December.
The reports were, unfortunately, incomplete. For two of the
developments, no information was available from 1968 until 1975.
This absence of reporting corresponded with the years which the
CHA resisted the federal government in its.tenant selection proce-
dures, and failure to file the reports was in part another
expression of defiance and also an indication of the casual manner
with which CHA was run during those years. It must be remembered
that these years from which data was unavailable were key transi-
tional years, for it was furing this period that the 1-2-3 rule
was implemented and the Brooke Amendment went into effect. Although
the interim years' information is missing, it is possible to
extrapolate the trends from 1968 until 1975. A sample of four to
six years' information was selected for each development. The
years from which the data was taken roughly correspond to census
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years, within the restrictions of available information. The
reports were not filed at all until 1954. A sample of apartments
were taken for the following years:
Washington Elms 16% sample 54 apartments
1943, 1955, 1960, 1965, 1967, 1975
Putnam Gardens 20% sample 25 apartments
1956, 1960, 1968, 1975
Corcoran Park 20% sample 31 apartments
1955, 1960, 1967, 1968, 1973, 1975
For each year examined, the following information was analyzed:
Age of the head of household
Family size
Number of minors
Length of stay; turnover
Race
Family income, per-capita income
Number of workers
Source of income
Rent
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A variety of statutes, summaries of statutes, regulations,
circulars, and handbooks were used to prepare the chapter on
legislation and regulations. They are too numerous to mention
here.
